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SITING TRANSMISSION LINES IN A
CHANGED MILIEU: EVOLVING NOTIONS
OF THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" IN
BALANCING STATE AND REGIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS*
ASHLEY C. BROwN** & JIm RoSSI***
This Article discusses how state public utility law presents a
barrierto the siting of new high-voltage transmissionlines to
serve renewable resources, and how states can approach the
law's evolution in order to preserve a role for state regulators
in a new energy economy in which renewable energy will
play a significant role. The traditional approach to determining the "public interest" in siting transmission lines is
well on its way to obsolescence. Two developments over the
past fifteen years have begun to challenge this paradigm.
First, policies at the federal level and in many states have
encouraged increased competition in generation, contributing to de-monopolization of the bulk power side of the industry. Second, the increased emphasis on the environment,
energy independence, and other public policy objectives has
resulted in a dramatically increased demand for renewable
energy, particularly due to heightened attention to climate
change. Given that wind power-the most economically viable renewable resource on a bulk-power basis-is feasible
predominantly in locations far removed from load centers,
the demand for new multistate transmission facilities has
been brought clearly into focus.
After an Introduction, Part I describes the existing arrangements in several resource-rich Western states for siting new
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transmission lines, and the coexistence of those arrangements with a conventional understandingof the public interest in determining need and addressing environmental concerns under traditionalstate transmissionsiting laws. Part
II discusses transmission issues related to the competitive
wholesale market and increased attention to climate change,
and highlights how federal law has expanded to accommodate some of these concerns. PartIII emphasizes the need for
a new definition of the public interest that might better reflect these new market circumstances and opportunities,and
highlights the two main barriers to this: (1) legislative
and/or regulatory inertia; and (2) an outdated costallocation model. The public interest under most state siting
statutes is sufficiently capacious to give regulators some flexibility to evolve, but in other instances legislative action may
be needed. In addition, the state cost-of-service ratemaking
model must evolve to a more regional approach to allocating
the costs of new transmission.
INTRODUCTION

In planning and approving the siting of new transmission
lines, most state regulators balance the benefits of a new
transmission line against the potential adverse consequences.
This common approach to transmission siting is grounded in
the traditional model of a vertically integrated public utility
monopoly franchise, for which the primary purpose of a siting
decision is to locate infrastructure to serve the utility's native
load customers. Under the traditional paradigm, the burden of
financing new transmission infrastructure is allocated to a utility's incumbent customers under cost-of-service ratemaking
principles, based on an understanding that these customers
will benefit from the new line. In making their decisions siting
authorities have been required to first determine the need for
transmission infrastructure, usually defined in economic
terms. 1 The notion of the "public interest" that regulators consider in their balancing analysis implicitly focuses on benefits
1. A distinction is sometimes made between lines being built for reliability
purposes and those being built for economic purposes. Since the determination of
what constitutes "reliability" is, at root, an economic concept (namely, the value of
lost load), this Article makes no distinction between the two. Some siting agencies, however, may well see the siting of lines to facilitate the marketing of a
state's energy resources as a lesser order of need, since its objective is, almost by
definition, driven by economic goals rather than system reliability. For states
seeking to site lines, particularly for selling their energy, the distinction is one to
keep in mind.
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to the customers of a specific utility system, or to the consumers located in an individual state.
The traditional public utility paradigm from which today's common approach to siting evolved was predicated on individual utilities carrying out their planning activities largely
in private, and using (or threatening to use) their powers of
eminent domain to carry out their plans for building transmission to link power supply sources (generation facilities) and
consumer demand (load). Utility regulators in some states assumed active roles in overseeing the process, but in others the
regulatory approach has always been more laissez faire. However, even where state utility regulators took a laissez faire
regulatory posture, local land use regulators often exercised
considerable scrutiny over proposed new facilities-although
more from the standpoint of local impacts than from a broader
balance of costs and benefits for the overall system within that
state, and much less on a broader regional level.
Over the past three decades, the traditional public utility
paradigm morphed into the predominant current siting model-in which the siting determination is made on a centralized
basis by a designated state agency-because a number of
tensions rendered the old paradigm both impractical and
anathema to a wide array of interests. From the public side,
ratepayers were opposed to paying for what they believed to be
"excess capacity" (that is, more investment in utility plants and
transmission than was necessary to provide adequate service)
possessed by utilities. 2 Ratepayers demanded more transparent and participatory planning activities by monopoly utilities
to whom they were captive and whose costs they were obliged
to pay. 3 In addition, the assessment of need was expanded to
include environmental concerns, such as increased resistance
to building new facilities on environmental and aesthetic
grounds, as well as the concerns of those who believed they
were victimized by the asymmetry between individuals bearing
the environmental and social costs and those deriving the
2. See Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A Case Study in Government Regulation, 33 TULSA L.J. 827, 834 (1998) (observing that "[o]ne consequence of the traditional rate formula encouraging capital investment was plant
expansion because returns were calculated on capital investment").
3. Most, if not all, of the controversy regarding "excess capacity" revolved
around generation and not transmission, but the changing paradigm affected the
siting of both. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in
Retrospect: Cancelled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1984)
(describing the problem of excess capacity in electric power generation).
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economic benefits. 4 For utilities, the increased transaction
costs of obtaining all required permits from multiple jurisdictions for new plants and lines and the difficulties of complying
with largely incoherent, inconsistent, and even contradictory
sets of policies applicable to the siting of new assets was not
sustainable.5 Many utilities were also concerned that reviews
by local land use regulators tended to emphasize local impacts
over system-wide benefits. 6
This more contemporary approach to siting was a compromise between consumer groups (as well as other public interest
groups) and utilities to adopt what was often described as "onestop shopping" for building new generating plants and transmission lines. State siting agencies' centralized proceedings
enable the public to participate in utility planning and siting of
facilities in exchange for a single forum applying a single set of
statewide policies for making siting decisions that either
preempt or allow for overruling local authorities, and combine
state powers into a single agency.7 Environmental stakeholders also find attractive the requirement that applicants for
siting authority prove that there is a need for a facility whose
value exceeds the environmental cost associated with the new
facility.8 Additionally, to the satisfaction of utilities in many, if
4. Some came to characterize such opposition as "NIMBY-ism": Not-In-MyBack-Yard. While some of the opposition to new facilities may well have constituted an exercise in parochialism, the inherent asymmetry between perceived local environmental or aesthetic insult and more geographically dispersed economic
benefits is an inherent aspect of siting new facilities on the interconnected grid,
and, therefore, an unavoidable source of potential conflict.
5. See Hoang Dang, New Power, Few New Lines: A Need for a Federal Solution, 17 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 327, 343 (2002) (describing how many states
"have consolidated the siting process into a one-stop permitting process that allows state authorities to preempt local governments").

6. See id. at 344 ("Consolidating the approval process with state authorities
allows the state authorities to balance the impact of the transmission expansion
against not only the local needs, but also the statewide and regional needs.").
7. Not all states adopted this centralized approach. There are still twenty or
so states that operate on the original paradigm, in which multiple local governments must approve transmission lines. See Ashley C. Brown & Damon Daniels,
Vision Without Site, Site Without Vision, ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 2003, at 23, 24.
8. States vary widely in regard to how agencies should balance costs and
benefits of a proposed facility. Some require that state-level agencies merely find
that there is a need sufficient to justify construction of the facility, leaving consideration of environmental concerns to local governments. Others require that the
degree of need be probed more deeply depending on the severity of environmental
harm (i.e., the greater the need, the greater the level of environmental harm that
will be found tolerable). For further discussion of this second approach, see discussion infra Part I, contrasting the centralized approach of New Mexico with
that of other states.
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not all, jurisdictions using this approach, planning and siting
approval is widely perceived as constituting de facto, if not de
jure, regulatory approval of the project under consideration,
thus effectively removing the risk of any subsequent ratemaking determination of "imprudence" (i.e., a finding by regulators that may lead to disallowance of a utility's cost recovery)
for any risk other than those associated with actual right-ofway acquisition and construction. 9
While the regulatory process has evolved, two critical
factors have remained constant over the course of the transition from the original siting paradigm to the predominant contemporary approach. The first is that the cost of each new
transmission facility is generally included in the retail rate
base of the utility building it.lo While revenues derived from
"off system" users of the facilities (i.e., non-native load, or those
customers outside the utility's franchise area) may be credited
back to captive retail ratepayers (i.e., native load), the full risk
of the residual revenue responsibility for the line is generally
borne by native load customers.1 1 This widespread practice
makes the allocation of costs a critical (in many cases, deter9. It is important to note that the discussion of paradigm shifts in this Introduction is of general trends. As will be noted below, not all states have shifted
paradigms, and those that have use varying institutional arrangements for making siting decisions. See infra Part I.
10. See infra Part III.A-B.
11. Most states simply allowed recovery of the full cost of a transmission facility in rate base. See Richard P. Bonnifield & Ronald L. Drewnowski, Transmission at a Crossroads,21 ENERGY L.J. 447, 461 (2000) ("In the past, transmission
was generally built to deliver distant generation to the local loads of a vertically
integrated utility. The value of transmission for the utility investor was integral
with the return provided by generation and distribution. It was the generation
prudence review by the state utility commissions that justified the investment in
transmission expansion."). To the extent that "off system" users paid for their use
of it, subject to the timing and vicissitudes of rate cases, the revenue requirement
imposed upon native load customers might have been offset by the amount derived from such sales. In some cases state regulators only allowed the portion of
costs allocated to retail ratepayers into rate base, on the theory that customers
did not benefit from the line. For example, Virginia appears to limit cost recovery
to lines in utility biennial plans designed to serve native load customers, or to
other costs utilities incur to serve native load obligations. See Brian R. Greene &
Katharine A. Hart, Public Utility Law, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 295, 309 (2008). Subsequent to the formation of Regional Transmission Organizations ("RTOs"), states
in regions served by the RTOs have acquiesced to transmission being put in
wholesale rate base, subject to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC")
jurisdiction, and merely pass on to customers FERC transmission tariff costs incurred in delivery of bulk power to them. For further discussion of FERC cost recovery for transmission, see Patrick J. McCormick III & Sean B. Cunningham,
The Requirements of the "Justand Reasonable" Standard:Legal Bases for Reform
of Electric TransmissionRates, 21 ENERGY L.J. 389 (2000).
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minative) component of obtaining siting approval for a proposed new transmission line. It is highly improbable that a
state will approve a line being built by a jurisdictional utility
(operating in that state) if the costs, or even the residual
revenue risks, are to be borne by local consumers while the
benefits are largely extra-jurisdictional.12 In short, there is a
powerful economic incentive to be parochial in siting decisions.
The second constant is that the power to make siting decisions
in electricity, contrary to the case in natural gas, 13 is (with
some exceptions on the margin) a power to be exercised by the
states-at least until the passage of the Energy Policy Act of
2005, which established a rather cumbersome (but also very
limited) federal "backstop" role.14 Despite this expansion of
federal authority and continued proposals to further expand it,
the power to site transmission lines remains primarily (often
exclusively) a state function. 15
The existing approach evolved fairly recently. However,
despite its relative youth, it is already well on its way to obsolescence. Two developments over the past fifteen years have
begun to challenge this approach. First, policies at the federal
level and in many states have encouraged increased competition in electric power generation, contributing to demonopolization of the bulk power (wholesale) side of the indus-

12. As is discussed infra in Part I, many states limit consideration to in-state
benefits, precluding regulators from even considering extra-jurisdictional benefits.
Even if such consideration is not limited by law, to the extent that state regulators are politically accountable to in-state constituents through gubernatorial appointment or election, they have little political incentive to approve such a line.
13. See Richard J. Pierce, The State of the Transition to Competitive Markets
in Natural Gas and Electricity, 15 ENERGY L.J. 323, 334 (1994) (noting differences
in FERC's siting authority between the Natural Gas Act and the Federal Power
Act).
14. See infra Part III.D for discussion of federal authority over transmission
siting, as well as proposals to expand FERC's jurisdiction.
15. States that have enacted comprehensive siting statutes have been anything but uniform in terms of which state agencies are vested with siting authority. In some states it is the Public Service Commission, in others it is in a freestanding siting agency, and in still others it is in a body comprised of representatives of multiple state agencies. In Florida, while environmental agencies and the
Public Service Commission have statutory responsibilities, the Governor's Cabinet
sits as the final siting agency and may exercise preemptive authority over local
governments and other siting decision makers. In other states, localities retain
considerable powers, but state regulators possess appellate authority. In short,
there is no single description of the decision-making process that accurately captures every state, even where there is a state siting statute. See Dang, supra note
5, at 343-44 (discussing Florida); Brown & Daniels, supra note 7, at 26-33 (discussing other states).
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try. 16 Federal policy has been promoting the evolution of competitive regional wholesale power markets, opening up opportunities for utilities, states, and-depending on state policyeven end users to look to the interstate markets, particularly to
robust and competitive ones, to both export and import electric
power. At the state level, some states have opened up retail
markets to competition, but even among those states who
maintain the retail supply monopoly, local utilities have been
encouraged or even required to conduct competitive bidding for
new power supply options and/or to evaluate the possibility of
procuring electric power in the competitive interstate market.1 7
Second, the increased policy emphasis on the environment,
energy independence, and other public policy objectives has resulted in a dramatic increase in the demand for renewable
energy, particularly due to heightened attention to climate
change. Given that wind power-the most economically viable
renewable resource on a bulk-power basis-is feasible predominantly in locations far removed from load centers, the demand for new multistate transmission facilities has been
brought clearly into focus.1 8
Not surprisingly, these two developments have presented
the opportunity for resource-rich states to adopt economic development strategies to promote the construction of generating
plants, often wind turbines, whose output is frequently intended as much for export into other states as it is for in-state
consumption. For example, Western states such as Colorado,
New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming (some, if not all, of which are
exporters of fossil-fueled power today) have the resource potential to be significant exporters in tomorrow's renewable energy
world. 19 If approved by regulators in these states, multistate
16. See infra Part II.A for a description of the widespread significance of the
wholesale power market to the industry today.
17. See id.
18. See infra Part II.B for a description of how heightened attention to climate change has brought this issue into focus.
19. Given that this Article was initially prepared for a conference on renewable resource development for specific states in the West, it is fairly comprehensive
in surveying siting laws in Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. Many
other states, including states outside of the West, have transmission siting laws
with similar features, so the observations we make about these states can be extended to other energy producing states in the U.S. as well. See, e.g., Dang, supra
note 5 (discussing Florida's siting statute); Greene & Hart, supra note 11 (discussing how Virginia limits cost recovery to native load benefits). States outside of the
West face equally significant challenges in attracting capital to expand transmission infrastructure for new renewable projects. See Matthew L. Wald, Wind Power is Feasible But Costly, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at B6 (noting
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transmission projects could: (1) foster economic development
based on exports of renewable energy to the energy sink states
(i.e., those states that consume more power than they produce
within their borders); and (2) advance critical federal and/or
state environmental goals by making it possible to more effectively substitute renewable energy for fossil fuels throughout
the western United States. Such projects would certainly provide benefits to local jurisdictional electricity consumers in
electricity producing states (in the form of increased reliability
as load increases and improved access to renewable energy for
their own jurisdictional customers). But the private money to
finance transmission would not necessarily come to the table
for the purpose of serving the needs of jurisdictional customers
alone; rather, it would likely come for the purpose of moving
power from the producing "source" states to the energy "sink"
states.
This reality challenges how regulators approach the public
interest under the current approach to siting as well as its predecessor paradigm-both of which are more inwardly focused
on the states' (or utility systems') own needs rather than on export potential. These new developments call into question the
effectiveness of public utility law, particularly in states that
wish to develop renewable energy sources for export. Can a siting agency, for example, consider the economic development or
non-local environmental benefits in deciding to approve a
project, a cost allocation, or a siting plan? What are the obstacles to using these factors as a sufficiently defensible rationale for our states to engage in multistate planning? Is solving the puzzle of cost allocation-i.e., keeping the costs to local
ratepayers commensurate with the benefits they receivesufficient to reconcile the tension between costs to jurisdictional customers and benefits to those outside the jurisdiction?
A failure to meaningfully address these issues may well
serve not only to undermine a state's economic development
plans, but may also undermine the evolution of viable, robust
interstate markets and broader national environmental objectives related to climate change. Statutes-as well as regulators' and policymakers' understanding of the public interestmust also evolve beyond the parochial, more narrowly focused
model that co-existed with traditional public utility regulation.
that wind could provide 20-30 percent of capacity in the Eastern two-thirds of the
U.S. by 2024, but that this would likely require transmission upgrades of about
$93 billion).
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In some instances, regulators face barriers to the evolution of
the public interest that must be addressed by state legislatures
or courts. These barriers must be confronted if state regulators
are to retain their relevance in a wholesale market that is increasingly attentive to climate change considerations.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the
existing arrangements in the states of Colorado, New Mexico,
Utah, and Wyoming for siting new transmission lines, and
highlights the co-existence of those arrangements with a conventional understanding of the public interest in determining
need and addressing environmental concerns under traditional

state siting laws affecting transmission. Part II discusses
transmission issues related to the competitive wholesale market and increased attention to climate change, and highlights
how federal law has expanded to accommodate some of these
concerns. Part III emphasizes the need for a new definition of

the public interest that might better reflect these new market
circumstances and opportunities, and highlights the two main
barriers to this: (1) legislative and/or regulatory inertia; and (2)

an outdated cost-allocation model. The public interest under
many state siting statutes is sufficiently capacious to give regulators some flexibility to evolve, but in other instances state
legislative action may be needed. In addition, the state cost-ofservice ratemaking model must evolve to a more regional approach to allocating the costs of new transmission. The expansion of federal authority over transmission line siting addresses
many barriers presented by parochial state laws, but it also
seems clear (with or without new legislation) that regional approaches to planning and siting will increase in significance.
Pending federal proposals fail to sufficiently address the issue
of cost allocation for new transmission infrastructure, which
will continue to pose a barrier to the development of new
transmission projects.

Even if new federal proposals are

adopted into law, state regulators will need to evolve their understanding of the public interest under siting laws to adapt to
new issues presented by the wholesale market and climate
change.
I.

EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRANSMISSION LINE SITING
AND COST ALLOCATION

Part I examines key elements of the transmission and siting approaches employed in several Western states: Colorado,
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New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. We generalize from these
approaches to highlight critical limits state laws present to fostering economic development based on exports of renewable
energy. In addition, we examine the extent to which state siting approaches may present a barrier to federal and/or state
environmental goals, especially where there are opportunities
to effectively substitute renewable energy for fossil fuels and
where interstate markets for renewable power have a potential
to flourish.
A. InstitutionalDecision Makers and Processes
While all four states adopt features of the more contemporary siting approach-as opposed to the traditional decentralized paradigm for siting-the four states have very different
institutional arrangements for making siting decisions. With
the exception of New Mexico, where the Public Regulation
Commission ("NMPRC") has siting power, 20 all of the states allow local authoritieS21 varying degrees of authority over the siting of new lines.
For example, in Colorado, all proposed new transmission
lines are required to obtain local approvals. In fact, prior to
applying to the Colorado Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC")
for the required Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity ("CPCN"), utilities must have notified affected local governments of the intended filing. 22 While a CPCN may be issued by
the CPUC before all local permits are obtained, 23 all local permits are required prior to construction. 24 Local governments
have a limited period of time to consider siting applications, 25
and failure by local government to respond on a timely basis to
an application deems the application approved. 26 If the statu20. N.M. STAT. § 62-9-1.A (2004).
21. "Local authorities" means both counties and municipalities, as applicable.
22. COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-20-108(4)(a) (2009).
23. City of Fort Morgan v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 159 P.3d 87, 89 (Colo.
2007).
24. Any adverse local decisions on applications for approval, however, are
subject to appellate review by the CPUC, as long as an application for a CPCN
has been filed. COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-20-108(5)(a).
25. Local authorities have twenty-eight days to ask applicants for additional
information. Id. § 29-20-108(2). Final decisions by local governments must be
rendered within 120 days of filing a preliminary application (if the preliminary
application is required by local land use regulations), or within ninety days of the
filing of a final application. Id.
26.

Id.
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tory time period for a CPCN lapses without CPUC action, the
CPCN is approved. 27 Except for constitutional claims, CPUC
decisions on CPCN applications are subject to judicial review
by the district court on issues of law only.2 8 The state has also
adopted an Energy Resource Zone statute under which the
regulated utilities are required to develop a plan every two

years for needed transmission and submit it to the CPUC.29 In
addition, the statute mandates that CPUC should issue a
CPCN for the utility's plans presented under the Energy Resource Zones if it is necessary for Colorado customers or for the
utility to meet Renewable Portfolio Standard ("RPS") goals. 30
Air permits must be obtained from the Colorado Department of
Public Health and the Environment. 3 1
Other Western states, as many other states throughout the
U.S., follow a similar approach. In Utah, applicants for siting
approval are required to seek local siting permits, as well as a
CPCN, by the Public Service Commission ("UPSC"). 32 Environmental permits must be obtained from the state's Department of Environmental Quality. 3 3 Local governments have a
limited time period to respond to an application, 34 and if they
fail to do so applicants may seek a review by the Utility Facility
Review Board. 35 The state also provides that in the event an
applicant and a local government are in dispute over an application, the Board will resolve the matter. 36
27. In regard to CPCN applications, the CPUC has sixty days to approve or
deny, or to ask for additional information. Id. § 24-65.1-108(1). According to
section 24-65.1-108(2), there are specific requirements for a denial, but no
requirements for an approval. Id. § 24-65.1-108(2). From this we infer that inaction can result in an approval but not in a denial.
28. Id. § 40-6-115.
29. Id. § 40-2-126.
30. Id. § 40-2-126(3)(a).
31. Id. § 25-7-101.
32. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 54-4-25(1), (4)(a)(i) (2008).
33. Id. § 19-2-101.
34. Id. § 54-14-303(1)(e) (specifying a sixty-day window).
35. Id.
36. Either the local government or the applicant may seek review if there is a
dispute over the following:
1) local government requirements resulting in excess costs without the
local government agreeing to pay for such costs;
2) a utility's belief that a condition imposed by the local government will
impair safe, reliable, adequate, or efficient service;
3) failure of a local government to approve construction of a facility
needed for requisite service quality;
4) failure of the local government to act on an application within the 60day time period allowed by statute;
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Likewise, in Wyoming, all transmission line applicants
must obtain local approvals first and then proceed to a second
level of review. The Public Service Commission of Wyoming
("WPSC") is empowered to hear appeals by utilities from an
adverse decision by local authorities on a siting application. 37
A second level of review is conducted by the WPSC but there
are no statutory time limits for the WPSC to render a decision. 38 For non-utilities, the Industrial Siting Council, a body
within the Department of Environmental Quality, carries out a
third level of review. 39 The Council has a statutorily defined
time period in which it must render a decision. 40 All applicants
must submit to an environmental review by the Department. 4 1
New Mexico, however, adopts a more streamlined process
for transmission line siting. Applicants need not seek local
A final decision by the NMPRC
government approvals.
preempts all local laws and regulations and is deemed conclusive on all questions of siting, land use, aesthetics, and any
other state or local requirements affecting the siting. 42 All applicants must file two applications with the NMPRC: one for a
CPCN and a second one for a location permit.43 The New
Mexico PSC has a statutorily defined time period in which it
must decide whether to grant a CPCN, although it also may extend that time frame for a limited time period. 44 Failure to act
5) inconsistent rulings by affected local governments where the proposed
facility straddles the border between the two jurisdictions; or
6) cost allocation where a facility located in one jurisdiction is intended
to serve customers exclusively outside that jurisdiction.
Id. § 54-14-303.
37. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 37-2-213 (2009).
38. Id. (describing the procedures by which Commission approval takes effect). While this section does not explicitly say that there are no time limits, it
does suggest as much because it does not provide for effect by default.
39. Id. §§ 35-12-102, -103, -106.
40. Id. § 35-12-113(a) (specifying forty-five days after receiving an application
and conducting a hearing).
41. Id. § 35-12-106.
42. N.M. STAT. § 62-9-3.1 (2004).
43. Id. § 62-9-l.A (requiring the CPCN); id. § 62-9-3.B (requiring the location
permit). A third application is required for a right of way width determination
when the requested right of way is more than 100 feet. Id. § 62-9-3.2.A.
44. Id. § 62-9-1.C (specifying a nine-month limitation on consideration of an
application, with a possibility of a six-month extension). If an application for a
location permit is filed after an application for a CPCN has been approved, the
NMPRC has ninety days to rule on the location permit; if the application for a location permit is filed simultaneously with a CPCN application, the Commission
has nine months to rule on both applications. Id. § 62-9-3.K. The NMPRC has six
months to rule on an application for a right of way determination. Id. § 62-93.2.F.
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constitutes approval. 4 5 While New Mexico does require parties
to seek a local permit, if a local application is not approved
within a defined time period, it can be approved at the state
level. 46
At first glance, the responsibilities assigned to local governments in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming might be expected
to skew decision making to focus heavily on concerns about the
local impact of proposed new transmission lines. Of course,
there are a variety of reasons localities may be unduly biased
by what they perceive as adverse local impacts. Many businesses and residential landowners simply do not want to either
have or even look at transmission lines close to their property
for a host of reasons, ranging from health fears about electromagnetic fields ("EMFs"), 47 to aesthetics, perceived impact on
crops and livestock, diminution of the economic value of their
property, environmental concerns, and a variety of other reasons. 4 8 Such local concerns are magnified by a mismatch between who bears the costs and who benefits from a new line.
Weighing costs and benefits across the entirety of a regional
power market is almost certain to produce a very different result than if costs and benefits are focused through the prism of
a local government official. Local officials may view costs as
quite visible, dramatic, and focused, while the benefits may be
far less apparent and are likely to be garnered by people and
businesses distant from the locality where decisions are being
made and the physical effects are felt. 4 9 Another potential
problem with local decision making in siting new transmission
45. Id. § 62-9-1.C.
46. W. Interstate Energy Bd., Summary of State Transmission Siting Law in
the Western Interconnection, http://www.westgov.org/wieb/transmission/other/
siting-paper.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Summary of Siting Law]
(specifying 240 days).
47. It is not the intention of this Article to make any pronouncements on the
health effects of EMFs associated with transmission lines. That is for scientists to
determine. What is clear and indisputable, however, is that public concerns about
EMFs are very often raised by interveners and public commentators in the course
of siting decision-making processes as grounds for opposing the permitting of such
facilities.
48. See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Condemning Open Space: Making Way for National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (Or Not), 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 399,
401 (2008) (describing aesthetic and conservation related concerns in siting
transmission lines); Jim Rossi, Transmission Siting in Deregulated Wholesale
Power Markets: Re-imagining the Role of Courts in Resolving Federal-State Siting
Impasses, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 315, 316-19 (2005) (describing environ-

mental and other concerns in siting a transmission line in Connecticut).
49. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 48, at 316-19 (describing opposition to the
Cross-Sound line in Connecticut).
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lines is the increased opportunity for interveners, such as competitors or organized interest groups whose motivations and
objectives may have little to do with the specific line being proposed, driving up transaction costs for an applicant. 50 Simply
stated, the more regulatory bodies to which an applicant must
apply, the higher the process costs will be and the more likely
it is that the litigiousness of intervenors could drive those costs
even higher. 51 The result could well be to discourage investors
from committing to projects and applicants or potential applicants from building.
While many local officials have a sense of balance and public interest that will lead them to give a fair hearing to the applications that come before them, there are also institutional
reasons to view this process with serious caution. A number of
factors contribute to potential downsides. The first is that, because some local governments may see benefits from the taxes
paid by transmission owners or see a transmission line as a
tool for economic development (perhaps not the new lines
themselves but, more likely, the generators connected to them),
the salience of local impacts may lead local decision makers to
focus on the benefits a new line presents to the local community rather than to a larger constituency. 52 A second constraining factor is the tight deadlines for decision making imposed by
states such as Utah and Colorado. 53 While tight deadlines
might lead to quick rejections, the transaction costs in obtaining local decisions are also reduced by the short time frames
allotted for them. Third, the existence of appellate mechanisms in many states tends to somewhat constrain parochialism
in final outcomes, as redress from overly parochial local decisions is readily available to frustrated applicants. 54 In fact, the
50. Id.
51. The costs are not simply economic or financial. Entities seeking to build
transmission lines must often expend considerable political and goodwill capital
in order to gain needed approvals.
52. Taxes and economic development may not be the only benefits bestowed
on local jurisdictions. It is not at all unknown for transmission developers to offer
other "goodies," such as parks, community centers, maintenance equipment, fire
equipment, etc., in order to "sweeten the pie" for communities.
53. UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-14-303(1)(e) (2008) (specifying a sixty-day window);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-20-108(2) (2009) (requiring local governments to render
their decisions within 120 days of filing a preliminary application, or within ninety days of the filing of a final application).
54. Such appeals will ultimately be to courts, which have the jurisdiction to
hear appeals of adverse decisions of regulatory bodies. Ultimately, however, most
state appellate courts defer to determinations of regulatory bodies in complex and
controversial administrative law matters, such as siting determinations. See Mi-

HeinOnline -- 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 718 2010

2010]

SITING TRANSMISSION LINES

719

appellate processes may well drive local officials to use their
fleeting powers to derive certain concessions from an applicant
that they might not be able to obtain if they simply reject an
application and leave their fate to the appellate body.5 5
As these problems highlight, the more power vested in local authorities to make siting decisions, the more vagaries and
uncertainties are also introduced to the process. While a state
may have economic and environmental objectives that would be
well-served by the construction of a new transmission line, allowing such decisions to be made at the local level by authorities who may have other (often conflicting) objectives in mind
poses a high risk of leaving the state's broader objectives unaccomplished. 56 That is not to say that localities should not have
some say in the siting of lines, but it is important to distinguish
between having input and having decision-making powers.
While perhaps the roles of local authorities in siting in effect
only comprise input to the process, given the imposition of tight
deadlines and appellate mechanisms, the effect of other variables such as criteria for appeals, overall transaction costs,
and a variety of other factors suggest that local authorities can
have considerable influence on outcomes as opposed to merely
providing input.

B. Eligibility To Apply For Siting Approval / Exercise
Powers Of Eminent Domain
Traditionally, electric transmission lines were built,
owned, and operated by utilities. 5 7 Because in-state utilities
chael Pappas, No Two-Stepping in the Laboratories:State Deference Standards
and Their Implications for Improving the Chevron Doctrine, 39 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 977 (2008) (observing that the vast majority of states give due weight or
strong deference to agencies' reasonable constructions of statutes).
55. Note 52, supra, suggests the types of concessions that are sometimes
sought although others, such as changing the precise routing of lines or imposing
conditions, such as putting the line underground, are also common.
56. As has been well-recognized since James Madison laid out the basic argument in Federalist No. 10, the more local the decision-making process, the more
likely the process will give weight to parochial concerns. THE FEDERALIST No. 10
(James Madison). In the context of local siting decisions, NIMBY-type concerns
could be expected to predominate, but would be less likely to carry the same degree of weight at the state or federal level, given that the broader the political
base, the more likely it will be that powerful interest groups will cancel each other
out.
57. Historically, electric utilities were vertically integrated, providing generation, transmission, and distribution, primarily for the purpose of serving customers within their monopoly franchise area. See Jon Wellinghoff & David L.
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traditionally were the entities planning, proposing to build, and
requesting siting for transmission lines-and because only utilities generally qualify for cost-of-service recovery for capital
projects-under both the traditional paradigm and current approach many states limit the full benefits of transmission siting
approval to utilities. For example, non-utilities proposing
transmission lines, along with utilities lacking contracts with
in-state customers (such as out-of-state utilities), may not qualify for the full benefits of siting approval, including the power
of eminent domain. 58 Many laws relating to applications for
siting approval and to the use of eminent domain to acquire
right-of-way have been written in such a way that, under modern market conditions discussed below, 59 they constitute a barrier to attracting non-utility capital to the transmission business.
For example, in Colorado, it is not clear that anyone other
than a public utility may apply to site a transmission line, although a public utility is defined broadly so that any party
operating transmission lines may be a public utility. 60 This
contrasts the broader language found in some other state statutes, which explicitly allows anyone to apply. For example, in
Utah, anyone can apply to local governments for transmission
siting permits. Also, utilities are required to apply to the
UPSC for a CPCN, but non-utilities may proceed with local
government approvals and need not apply for a CPCN. 61 New
Mexico does not limit who can apply, allowing both utilities

Morenoff, Recognizing the Importance of Demand Response: The Second Half of
the Wholesale Electric Market Equation, 28 ENERGY L.J. 389, 389 (2007); see also
Peter Z. Grossman, Is Anything Naturally a Monopoly?, in THE END OF A
NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER
INDUSTRY 11, 30-32 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003).
58. While so-called "merchant" (non-utility) transmission projects may be inefficient in certain contexts, there is considerable benefit to new entrants building
transmission facilities without imposing the risks of new transmission investment
on incumbent ratepayers. Merchant facilities, however, frequently face legal impediments in individual states and have thus had limited success to date. See
Rossi, supra note 48, at 316-19, 333-35 (discussing barriers to merchant transmission and merchant power plants in states such as Connecticut and Florida).
59. See infra Part II.A.
60. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-1-103 (2009); see also Summary of Siting Law,
supra note 46, at 13. Summary of Siting Law only discusses the process for obtaining a CPCN for utilities, but references the broad definition of a utility in
Colorado. A broad definition of a utility, however, does not allow an entity that
does not want to take on the obligations of the state's utility laws to apply to site a
transmission line.
61. Barnes v. Lehi City, 279 P. 878 (Utah 1929).
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and non-utilities to apply for siting permits. 62 Wyoming also
permits all parties to apply to site a transmission line, but, as
noted above, the process for handling applications is different
for non-utilities than it is for utilities. 63

C.

Need Determinations

In the most common current approach to transmission siting approval, state regulators evaluate two critical substantive
criteria: need and environmental impact assessment. All new
construction, by definition, will have some effect on the environment, landscape aesthetics, and the people living and working in reasonable proximity to the facility. 64 Officials in the siting process must decide if those effects, which are generally
viewed as adverse, are outweighed by the benefits the proposed
new line will bring. Those benefits are typically economic in
nature. Further complicating the task for siting officials is a
fundamental asymmetry: in most cases, the greatest adverse
impact is geographically localized, while the benefits are geographically dispersed across a wide region. 65 Some of that
asymmetry may be mitigated to a degree by rising concerns
over climate change and carbon emissions-the consideration
of which has the effect of looking at the impact on a far broader
geographic basis, a subject explored below. 66
Even before assessing the impact, however, the initial
question for siting officials is what justifies construction of the
new line in the first place. Historically, vertically-integrated
utilities simply developed and presented on their own their individual growth projections, planned facility retirements, and
plans for meeting that demand in terms of generation and
transmission lines to link the plants to load centers, submitting
them to siting authorities for approval. 67 Beginning in the
1980s, regulators in many states created public planning
processes-often called "least cost planning" ("LCP") or "integrated resource planning" ("IRP")-designed to test utility forecasts through public scrutiny and analysis. These processes
were also often designed to encourage, if not compel, utilities to
62. N.M. STAT. § 62-9-1 (2004).
63. See supra notes 35-39.
64. See supra note 4.
65. Of. supra note 56 (mentioning Madison).
66. See infra Parts I.D & II.B.
67. This was the typical regulatory process under vertical integration, which
predominated for most of the twentieth century. See supra note 57.
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strive for greater efficiency not only in their own production
and delivery operations, but to promote conservation and efficiency (demand side management ("DSM")) by their customers.
In terms of the siting process, the effect was that the demand
forecasts brought to siting agencies may have gone through
more filters than had been customary in the past. In many
cases, it raised new issues regarding efficiency gains that siting
regulators had to consider before agreeing that a proposed new
facility was necessary to meet demand.6 8
Because this Article is focused on siting in terms of economic development and energy exports, it will not provide a
comprehensive survey of the traditional need criteria applied
by state regulators, but will focus on need criteria and determinations relevant to the focus of the present problem at hand:
namely, regional economic development which may require the
consideration of out-of-state or off-system benefits. 69 For purposes of this Article, single system benefits are conceptually
comparable to single state benefits, in the sense that we are
examining out-of-system trading opportunities in the case of
multistate utilities, as comparable to single state benefits in
the context of single state utilities. In both cases, siting officials would be looking at one state's native-load customers versus another state's.
In terms of explicit statutory or legal authorization, the
ability of siting authorities to consider factors other than the
traditional need criteria for serving native load customers has
been quite limited. For example, in Colorado, anyone applying
to site a transmission line must demonstrate a need for the line
to be built.70 Apart from the traditional need criteria to serve
native load customers within the state, the only specific guidance given to the CPUC or to local authorities, as the siting
authorities, is that it appears that they may consider achieve68. See, e.g., Maine Rejects Plan to Import Electric Power From Canada,N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 1989, at A32 (explaining that Maine rejected a new source of
electricity imports, making reference to insufficient efforts at demand side
management).
69. Some states have been forced to consider multistate benefits simply by
virtue of the fact that utilities serving those states operate in multiple jurisdictions. For example, notwithstanding limited language in their statutes, states
such as Utah and Wyoming (with PacifiCorp, a utility serving customers in both
states) have experience with looking at benefits on a system wide, rather than
single state basis. See PacifiCorp Company Overview, http://www.pacificorp.com/
about/co.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2010) (noting that PacifiCorp operates in six
states, including Utah and Wyoming).
70. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-5-102 (2009).
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ment of the state's objectives in meeting its RPS (an obligation
that a certain percentage of each utility's sales come from
renewable sources) in making siting decisions. 7 1 There is no
statutory reference to any interests outside the state, or any
specific reference to the export or import of energy other than
as it relates to RPS. Thus, depending upon how the statutes
are construed, the CPUC and local siting authorities are either
precluded from considering out-of-state needs, or may give
limited consideration to such needs as long as they are reasonably related to the needs of the state and/or serve Colorado
consumers.
Other states in the West face similar legal limitations on
need determinations. New Mexico's creation of a Renewable
Energy Transmission Authority ("NMRETA"), 72 with an objective of exporting the state's renewable energy, suggests that
the state legislature clearly contemplated building some lines
for multistate purposes. Outside of projects that fall within
that statute, where an applicant in New Mexico is required to
demonstrate need, New Mexico provides no statutory guidance
for regulators' consideration of multistate benefits. Moreover,
the requirement that a specific application be filed for a rightof-way determination where the applicant is seeking a right of
way for projects with a larger width would appear to impose an
additional transaction burden on those proposing larger lines
and is more likely to have greater impact on out-of-state applicants. 7 3 In Utah, applicants for siting a line must demonstrate
need but there is no statutory guidance with regard to out-ofstate considerations other than the reference to facilities for
"the economic benefit of such public utility,"74 a phrase that at
least hints at benefits that may accrue from something other
than serving native load customers. 7 5 Similarly, in Wyoming,
71. Id. § 40-2-124. In that connection, it is useful to note that nothing in Colorado law suggests that the siting authorities consider issues (such as economies
of scale) that might spill over into other states in the course of making siting decisions. In short, the guidance is largely inward-looking. The one exception is that
the CPUC is authorized to confer with, or hold joint hearings with, authorities of
other states or any agency of the United States in connection with any matter under title 40 of the Colorado Code, and to enter into cooperative agreements with
said entities to enforce the economic and safety laws of Colorado and the United
States. Id. § 40-2-115.
72. N.M. STAT. § 62-16A-3 (2004).
73. See id. § 62-9-3.
74.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 54-4-26

(2008).

75. Given that a single, multistate utility serves most of the state, that phrase
may have less significance, in terms of looking outside of that single system, than

HeinOnline -- 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 723 2010

724

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

there is little statutory guidance to siting authorities with regard to out-of-state benefits. 76

D. Externalities:Impact Assessment and Resource Mix
All state siting laws require a balancing of need against
the non-economic7 7 effects of the proposed facility.7 8 Traditionally, a host of such matters were considered, but most of them
were quite local in effect. These might have included (but were
not necessarily limited to) environmental harm, effects on
farming and livestock, health effects, fish and wildlife impacts,
fauna impacts, parkland and wilderness considerations, aesthetics, local air quality, commercial and tourism effects, and
watershed effects. The specific considerations varied somewhat from state to state, but in almost all jurisdictions the noneconomic factors taken into account were characteristically
local. NIMBY concerns, for example, are consistently considered by regulators in the siting process, and often drive the
process.
For example, in 2006, Southern California Edison proposed
to build a 230-mile high voltage transmission line from Blythe,
California to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, located fifty miles west of Phoenix, Arizona. The siting of the
line was approved by California regulators. 79 Arizona regulators, however, rejected the proposal, even though it would have

appears at first blush. It is also interesting to contemplate what meaning should
be attached to the fact that the statute refers to the benefit of the "utility," rather
than the utility's customers.

76. However, Wyoming has created the Wyoming Infrastructure Authority
("WIA") to promote the selling of energy output produced in the state. WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 37-5-303 (2009). It seems likely that, at least in terms of obtaining permits to further the purposes of the WIA, the definition of need looks not only to
the domestic needs of the state but also to the operations of the interstate bulk
power market beyond the state's boundaries.
77. Non-economic is being used in the context of external to the economics of
the electrical network. Some of the effects may, in fact, be economic, or have economic implications, but are external to the economics of the project and the interconnected grid. Thus, for purposes of this Article, they are described as "noneconomic."
78. See, e.g., supra Part L.A (describing state siting statutes); see also Brown
& Daniels, supra note 7 (describing state siting statutes).
79. So. Cal. Edison Co., Decision No. 07-01-040 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n Jan.
25, 2007), available at http://does.cpuc.ca.gov/published/FINAI_DECISION/
64017.pdf (order granting a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity).
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been paid for by California ratepayers.8 0 Emphasizing the
ostensible environmental costs that the line would impose on
Arizona at the expense of California, Arizona's regulators
called the line a "230-mile extension cord." 8 1 Among the concerns stated were environmental impacts on "everything from
native plants and wildlife to viewshed and archeological
sites."8 2 As one Arizona regulator bluntly put it, "I don't want
Arizona to become an energy farm for California. This project,
if we approved it, would use our land, our air and our water to
provide electricity to California."8 3
When siting officials find that the non-economic consequences of a proposed project are of sufficient adversity, they
can propose mitigation, such as changing a proposed route,
changing proposed parameters (for example, requiring a
widened right of way), or putting a line underground. In the
case of damages that cannot be mitigated, siting officials can
reject the line entirely. Needless to say, cost becomes a factor
in considering whether to order mitigation, or in the selection
of the precise type of mitigation required. Depending on the
nature of mitigation required, approvals conditioned on costly
mitigation can be the functional equivalent of a denial.
In some jurisdictions, the level of harm tolerated may be
viewed in terms relative to the degree to which the proposed
line is needed for local ratepayers. 84 In others, the limits of
tolerance may be more absolute.8 5 It is also likely that states
with a relative tolerance for non-economic adverse consequences (such as Arizona) are likely to have a higher level of
tolerance for lines they see as essential for reliability of supply
to customers in their jurisdiction than for lines they see as be80. So. Cal. Edison Co., Case No. 130, Decision No. 69638 (Ariz. Corp.
Comm'n June 6, 2007), available at http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/docketpdf/
0000073735.pdf (order denying Certificate of Environmental Compatibility).
81. Press Release, Heather Murphy, Public Information Officer, Ariz. Corp.
Comm'n, Regulators Reject "Extension Cord for California" (May 30, 2007), available at
http://www.energylegalblog.com/files/ACCPressReleaseDeversII
Vote.pdf.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. It is only natural, for example, that regulators consider harms in a relativistic way insofar as they are required to consider the impact on local or native
load customers, or to the extent that they do so as a matter of regulatory practice.
85. See, e.g., In re Black Hills Power and Light, Docket No. 20002-44-EA-94 at
9 (Wyo. PSC 1995) (discussing the environmental impact and potential mitigation
measures and emphasizing the importance of the line; this can be seen as more
relativistic analysis as it considers how much environmental insult will be tolerated and how it should be dealt with).
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ing primarily used to facilitate energy trading between utilities
and across jurisdictions. As noted above, some states require a
separate environmental analysis done outside the siting
process itself (e.g., Utah, Wyoming, and Colorado, where the
analysis is performed by the state environmental regulatory
agency), often with issuance of a separate permit. 86 Regardless
of how relativistic the siting authorities may be in their own
characterization of costs and benefits, such criteria or a separate environmental permit issued by state or local regulators
may trump even well-intending regulators who make an effort
to consider broader regional benefits in assessing need.
E. Cost Allocation Rate making Considerations
The common practice of state commissions in the United
States is to include the costs of the transmission assets of
jurisdictional utilities in retail rate base, even further focusing
the approval inquiry at the state level on benefits to in-state
customers. Such an approach is typical for western states,
which appear to make no distinction between the wholesale
transmission cost of service and the retail transmission cost of
service.87 For example, the approach PacifiCorp uses to recover
transmission costs in Utah, Idaho, and Wyoming, and the approach used to recover the costs of transmission in Colorado,
appear to combine transmission cost of service and wholesale
wheeling revenues with other cost of service functions, such as
generation, distribution, and overheads, to form a single retail
rate.88 To be precise, the costs of transmission are allocated to
native load rate base-most of which is retail, but some of
which may be used by transmission-dependent utilities, whose
purchase of transmission services fall within the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's ("FERC's") jurisdiction. 89
There are many users of transmission who are not native
load. For purposes of retail rate regulation, there are three basic ways that state regulators can deal with this issue of cost
86. See supra Part I.A.
87. Becky Wilson, Rocky Mountain Area Transmission Study ("RMATS")
States Transmission Cost Recovery Process 2 (Nov. 24, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Harvard Electricity Policy Group), available at
http://www.westgov.org/wieb/electric/Transmission%20RP/papers/UTtcr.pdf.
88. Id.
89. Section 201(b) of the Federal Power Act limits FERC's jurisdiction over
transmission to only wholesale transactions in the interstate market, and excludes distribution and retail transmission. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2006).
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allocation. One way (used by PacifiCorp) is to only include in
the rate base that portion of the assets required for native load
retail service and leave the utility to recover the balance of its
revenue requirements from FERC rates. 9 0 A variation on this
methodology is to exclude from retail rate base only that portion of the transmission dedicated to the service of wholesale
native load. 9 1 A second approach is to exclude transmission entirely from retail rate base and simply pass on the rates set by
FERC for the use of the grid by retail customers. 9 2 Finally, the
most common methodology (largely derived from the traditional monopoly model) is to include all prudently incurred transmission costs in the retail rate base, and then, over the course
of future utility rate cases, credit back to retail consumers
those revenues derived from wholesale users. 93
It is commonly perceived that such ratemaking practices
have nothing to do with siting new lines. In fact, as we argue
below, the practice states have historically used in allocating
the costs of transmission has had a profound impact on siting
lines throughout the United States. 94 That is because siting
authorities have been reluctant to site a transmission line for
their utilities when the costs-or at least the residual risks of
bearing them-are imposed on consumers who may not derive
much benefit from it.
II.

CONSTRAINED TRANSMISSION: INTERSTATE MARKETS AND

HEIGHTENED ATTENTION TO CLIMATE CHANGE

Part II discusses transmission issues related to two significant developments that have changed, and will continue to
change, the electric power industry: the deregulated wholesale
market and increased attention to climate change. While federal law has expanded to accommodate some of these concerns,
90. Colorado, for example, places the cost of transmission in retail rate base,
although its commission has acknowledged that beneficiaries of a transmission
line may not be the primary persons who may bear the costs. Pub. Serv. Co. of
Colo., Decision No. C06-0786, 2006 Colo. PUC LEXIS 692 (Colo. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n June 29, 2006).
91. Wilson, supra note 87, at 3 (observing that "[u]nder this approach, retail
customers bear the risk of any difference in wholesale transmission cost of service
and firm wholesale wheeling revenue").
92. "This approach is the basis for FERC wholesale wheeling transmission
tariffs (OATTs) and a similar approach is also used in Utah and Idaho for retail
recovery of natural gas pipeline cost." Id.
93. Id.
94. See infra Part III.D.
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and several additional proposals for reform are pending, 95 state
siting laws have not provided sufficient authority for states to
expand infrastructure to accommodate either wholesale power
markets or to expand infrastructure to accommodate renewable
energy resources. 96
A.

Wholesale Competition

Any discussion of state public utility regulation today must
begin against the backdrop of federal policies supporting competition in wholesale bulk power supply markets. Competition
has radically changed the nature of the electric power industry,
calling into question many of the traditional assumptions of
state utility regulation, including transmission siting. Wholesale power markets have been largely deregulated since the
mid-1990s, when FERC adopted open access policies for transmission in Order No. 888.97 Congress has not opposed open
access principles, and under the Obama Administration, FERC
continues to embrace the open access goals for wholesale power
markets adopted by FERC during the Clinton Administration
and continued under the Bush Administration. 98 Indeed, promoting competition in bulk power markets has been a consistent characteristic of federal energy policy dating back to the
late 1970s. 99 It only fully evolved into open access over the
95. Part II.C discusses the 2005 amendments to federal law as well as proposals to further amend federal law.
96. Some of the following descriptions of developments in wholesale markets,
such as heightened attention to climate change and federal legal developments,
echo in an expanded manner similar observations by Jim Rossi in The Trojan
Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015
(2009).
97. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access NonDiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540
(May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385 (2008)).
98. FERC's strategic plan, issued in 2009, continues to embrace the goals of
wholesale competition and open access to transmission for power suppliers.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION: THE STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FY20092014 7 (2009), http://www.ferc.gov/about/strat-docs/strat-plan.asp ("Improving the
competitiveness of these markets is important in achieving that goal because it
encourages new entry among supply-side and demand-side resources, spurs innovation and deployment of new technologies, improves operating performance, and
exerts downward pressure on costs.").
99. According to the web site of FERC, an independent agency with members
in both political parties:
National policy for many years has been, and continues to be, to foster
competition in wholesale power markets. In each major energy bill over
the last few decades, Congress has acted to open up the wholesale elec-
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course of FERC implementation of the Energy Policy Act of
1992, signed into law by the first President Bush.10 0 Under
federal open access policies, both utility and non-utility bulk
power suppliers should be able to compete on a more level playing field. This challenges the traditional public utility regime,
in which a utility that owns both transmission and generation
could make decisions to favor its own incumbent supply options
over competitors in making transmission decisions.1 0 1
As has been well recognized for a number of years, a competitive wholesale power market requires that significant physical or economic impediments to transmission be overcome. 10 2
If transmission is physically absent and/or priced based on the
wrong economic principles, bulk power supply markets will not
flourish. 10 3 Physical constraints can preclude remote, nonincumbent suppliers who do not own transmission from accessing customers; this is particularly problematic where existing
transmission lines are limited in scale or do not exist at all, as
may be the case in many remote areas that are resource rich
for the purpose of renewable power development. If transmission is not appropriately priced to reflect opportunity costs in
the wholesale power markets, there may be inadequate incentives for the development of transmission. At the same time,
new entrant bulk power suppliers must have access to transmission under terms and conditions that are comparable to existing suppliers, rather than on conditions that are anticompetric power market by facilitating entry of new generators to compete
with traditional utilities. As the third major federal law enacted in the
last 30 years to embrace wholesale competition, the Energy Policy Act of
2005 strengthened the legal framework for continuing wholesale competition as federal policy for this country. The Commission has acted
quickly and strongly over the years to implement this national policy.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Industries - Electric Competition,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/competition.asp (last visited Feb.
21, 2010).
100. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13201-13574 (2006)).
101. Such decisions may have been made for both efficiency-enhancing and anticompetitive reasons; the only intent here is to describe the reality of the movement towards wholesale competition and its inevitable implications, not to defend
it.

102. E.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Proposal to Deregulate the Market for Bulk
Power, 72 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1986).
103. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the
Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 469 (2005) (observing that the
shortage in transmission capacity throughout the nation "will eventually doom all
restructuring efforts and that will yield disastrous results for the entire U.S.
market no matter how it is structured, unless and until it is solved").
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titive. 104 Under the traditional vertical integration monopoly
paradigm, in which rate regulation was the norm, utilities had
little incentive to expand transmission for non-utility generation sources that did not serve native load customers, since
they could preserve their monopolies by building just enough
transmission to allow their own power supply to reach their
own customers. 105 In part as a result of this traditional model,
in the industry today certain areas of the U.S., such as parts of
the Northeast and portions of the West, present transmission
impediments for even existing sources of electric power.
While state siting authority may have been a stable
mechanism to attract investment for transmission under the
traditional public utility paradigm, many state siting statutes
and regulations have not been updated to accommodate the
interstate bulk power supply markets. Two aspects of state siting laws typically limit the ability of state regulators to consider opportunities for export and import opportunities in the
wholesale market in siting transmission lines. First, many
states limit the consideration of "need" to in-state benefits, rather than a broader consideration of the benefits of locating
and building a transmission line. Historically, and under the
approach used in many states today, state siting statutes envisioned a determination of need based on benefits to in-state
customers. 106 If a particular state's customers may benefit
from wholesale power markets, in terms of reliability or price
or from competitive bulk power markets, transmission expan104. The issue of non-discriminatory terms and conditions is not quite the
same as non-discriminatory pricing. Transmission services may well be provided
on a non-discriminatory basis even though some users pay more than others, as
long as the differences are based on justifiable circumstances such as geographic
differences or differential benefits. Non-discrimination means that the rules are
equally applicable to all, but those same rules may lead to differential prices or
other disparate impacts on different market participants. Because of the potential for differential pricing implications, especially based on location, many economists would contend that the mere existence of grid constraints does not impair
a market at all, as long as the pricing is correct. Others, including many advocates for renewable resources, particularly those in locations far removed from
load, contend that such price differentials are a barrier to their effective participation in the market.
105. The effect of constraining the grid to preserve monopoly power has a
number of by-products that are environmental and technological as well as economic. Failure to facilitate access not only favors incumbent utilities, it also tends
to favor incumbent generating units. The result is often extended lives for older,
"dirtier" generators, and barriers against optimal use of newer, more efficient
units. For that reason, it can also be a barrier to the full utilization of new renewable energy generating plants.
106. See supra Part I.B.
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sion could serve their interest. But, as discussed below, market
developments and concerns with climate change render such a
parochial understanding of benefits increasingly obsolete.
Second, many states limit who can apply to site a transmission
line; under existing law in many states, state siting authorities
generally lack the ability to even consider, let alone rely on,
export and import opportunities in the interstate wholesale
07
markets as a basis for siting transmission lines.
As to the need determination, many of the criteria siting
statutes instruct state regulators to consider focus on benefits
to in-state customers and do not include benefits to out-of-state
customers or to the wholesale supply market.10 8 Indeed, that
traditional scenario has come under enormous stress in the
face of the emergence of competitive bulk power markets, functional and corporate unbundling and de-verticalization, heightened concerns about resource utilization and mix, and because
state specific reviews of need seem less meaningful in the context of multistate markets. An excellent example of this
change is the question of what constitutes need in a competitive market. In a vertically-integrated monopoly model, the requirement to show need not only constitutes a possible justification for whatever environmental or other degradation might
occur, it also protects consumers from having to pay for capacity in excess of what was required to adequately and reliably
serve them. In a competitive market, on the other hand, where
supply and demand drive prices, and where consumers are not
"on the hook" to pay all of their suppliers' prudently incurred
costs, excess capacity is (at least from a consumer perspective)
a positive factor in driving down prices. From the opposite
perspective, existing generators are likely to challenge proposed new generating plants or new transmission which will
enable more generation to access more markets because of the
fear that new entrants will drive down prices. 109 The stark
107. See supra Part I.C.
108. See supra Part I.B.
109. In fact, the earlier discussion about facilitating non-utility entry into the
transmission business is worth mentioning again in the context that vertically
integrated utility incumbents have very powerful economic incentives not to build
transmission that would expose them to more competition. It is for that reason
that, in the organized RTO markets in North America, transmission planning has
been taken out of the hands of utilities and vested in the RTOs and their constituent processes. For discussion of the role of RTOs in transmission planning, see
James J. Hoecker, Transmission Planning-A New Lever for FERC?, NAT. GAS &
ELECTRICITY, Aug. 2007, at 21, 21, available at http://helppllc.com/transmission
planning0807.pdf. Since the Rocky Mountain states do not have a RTO, that op-
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question for siting officials in today's environment is what constitutes need in a competitive market.
It is a seemingly simple question, but in fact it is quite
complex. For states that view themselves as exporters of energy to a bulk power market, does the old paradigm, that need be
determined in the context of what is required to serve the consumers in a given state, get replaced by a new approach that
sees need in the broader context of the robustness of competition and the overall economic development of the state? Similarly, how does one determine need in the context of building
new transmission to enable clean renewable energy to displace
existing carbon-emitting generation that may yet have many
years of useful life? For coal producing states, that is a particularly vexing problem, since the net effect of allowing the renewable displacement of coal could well have adverse effects on
employment and the overall economy within the state, thereby
calling into question how such a state should define its own
economic development for purposes of need assessment in a siting proceeding. One further query worth mentioning is the
geographic context within which siting officials in one state
should consider need in another state. It is the same issue that

individual states face when local officials have siting powers
that impact an entire state, only now it is the question of an
individual state making decisions that impact an entire multistate region.
Nationally, states vary widely on how parochial their siting statutes and practices are, but at least one case from Massachusetts110 held that the state's Energy Facilities Siting
Board was without authority to site a line within the state unless the entirety of the benefits of the transmission line accrued
to in-state consumers. Some twenty years previously, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi held that eminent domain could

not be exercised in the state by a multistate utility that served
Mississippi customers because some of the beneficiaries of the
line for which condemnation powers were being used were outof-state.111 While not all states take such parochial points of
view, the issue of out-of-state benefits can be legally and politically problematic for siting officials. This is but a short sample
tion is not available, so the issue of who can seek siting approval for a new transmission lines is not an insignificant one.
110. Point of Pines Beach Ass'n v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 644 N.E.2d 221,
222, 223-24 (Mass. 1995).
111. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Connerly, 460 So.2d 107, 113 (Miss. 1984).
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of the dilemmas and vexing questions facing siting officials in
the current electricity market environment. How then are the
siting regimes in the states of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah,
and Wyoming, from a legal point of view, positioned to consider
them?
It seems apparent from reading the states' primary siting
statutes that the multistate markets were not the main priority of legislators in enacting the siting statutes, if they were
even contemplated at all. However, more recent statutes creating Wyoming's WIA and New Mexico's NMRETA contemplated
multistate markets for selling energy produced in their states
for purposes of economic development.1 12 It does not seem
much of a stretch for siting authorities in those two states to
take economic development and interstate markets into consideration in making their decisions. Similarly, given the increasing interdependence of states in the western U.S., and given
that reliability is a constant factor in all discussions of need in
siting proceedings, it is difficult to imagine siting authorities
not taking into consideration the nature of the interconnected
grid. Of course, consideration of needs for other states by siting a line in one's own state is not simply a selfless act of benevolence by the state taking those benefits into account. Instead, it may well be a decision taken to promote a state's
economic self interest as a seller of energy but also potentially
as a buyer of energy and a recognition of interdependence for
reliability. On the other hand, opponents of siting a particular
line could well contend that siting regulators are bound by language in narrowly crafted statutes.
Looming over this issue as well is the specter of federal
preemption. In stark political terms, the more parochial the
viewpoint state siting officials take over time, the more likely it
is that Congress will step in to preempt their authority where
Certainly, there is the
national goals are implicated.11 3
precedent of states preempting the powers of local governments
in siting for similar reasons (although it is a curious anomaly
that of the four states this Article describes in detail, only one,
New Mexico, has fully preempted local authoritiesl 14). It is al112. See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
two agencies.
113. This may happen through either express or implied preemption doctrine
under the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause, or through judicial application
of the Commerce Clause's dormant or "negative" limitations on a state adopting
and enforcing regulations that discriminate against out-of-state producers.
114. See supra Part I.
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so interesting to see how many states in the West have evolved
on these issues, from not wanting to be the energy farms for
giant "energy sinks" (i.e., California) to, in some cases, seeing
real benefits to becoming an energy farm. Of course, the degree of flexibility given to siting authorities to determine their
scope of discretion in looking at their own state's economic development and the nature of market opportunities in serving
the needs of consumers in another state will depend on how
broadly courts interpret the statutes under which regulators
operate. However, given the traditional weighing of local
impacts and narrow focus on benefits, along with limited statutory language in many state siting statutes, it seems likely that
many state regulators will take a more parochial rather than a
broader regional view in making their transmission siting
decisions.
Although most siting statutes do not explicitly mention
economic development policy, an assertion of regulatory power
to site a transmission line under such statutes may still stand
on firm ground if regulators can make a link between a transmission line and economic development policy. The import of
power may contribute to economic development by diversifying
power supply options, creating downward pressures on price,
providing customers greater reliability, and contributing to
general economic growth in ways that benefit customers. In
addition, and of perhaps greater economic growth opportunity,
the availability of competitive bulk power supply options, including the ability to procure electricity by long-term contracts
in the deregulated wholesale market, present many opportunities for resource-rich states to export power. Such a state
might rely on the benefits to its own economy and customers to
expand transmission within its borders, but under existing
state siting statutes the consideration of benefits may end at
its own borders if a neighboring or adjacent state is not willing
to expand transmission for the same reasons. For such a state,
the failure of an adjacent or neighboring state to site a facility
will limit the ability to export resources and potentially can
skew interstate bulk power supply markets.
A second significant legal limitation in state siting statutes
is that many states limit siting applications or only offer the
full range of benefits of siting approval, including eminent domain powers, to utilities. 115 For example, if a state is asked to
115.

See supra Part I.B.
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site a transmission line on behalf of an out-of-state applicant,
including an out-of-state utility-using the wires in the state
solely for the purpose of transmission-some state regulators
lack authority to even consider the application unless the outof-state applicant is willing to take on the obligations of an incumbent utility. 116
With the emergence of wholesale competition, however,
new players have entered the market. Merchant transmission
companies, and even generating companies that want to build
their own interconnections, are now viable business models being pursued in electricity markets in the U.S. and elsewhere. 117
For states interested in using their own resources for the export of energy, or for importing energy for the benefit of their
consumers and economies, the attraction of capital to the
transmission business would be facilitated if the investment
could be sought from a broader pool of capital than simply utilities. 118 In fact, utilities may well be unwilling to make transmission investments that others might find attractive. The
reasons why utilities might be reluctant to make transmission
investment that others are willing to make include a desire to
restrict or reduce competition, capital impairment of some sort,
inadequate regulatory incentives, unwillingness to use up political capital or public goodwill, or perhaps simply that the demands on their capital budget are such that some transmission
projects are of a lesser priority to them than they might be to
others.
116. Although historically a commission decision regarding an applicant has
been subjected to deference on appeal, some state statutes have been interpreted
narrowly to only allow applications from utilities with an obligation to serve instate customers. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 434 (Fla. 2000).
117. Part I.B discusses the implications of state siting laws for merchant
transmission.
118. There maybe a question in some states if, simply by virtue of operating a
transmission line, a company must register as a utility in a state because of the
nature of its business, see, for example, WYo. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-101(a) (2009),
which defines a public utility as "every person that owns, operates, leases, controls, or has power to operate, lease or control . . . (C) Any plant, property or facility for the generation, transmission, distribution . . . for the public of electricity."
(emphasis added). For purposes of this Article, we did not explore that issue because the primary focus is on whether someone other than the local incumbent
utility can seek approval to site new line. If obtaining that approval, ipso facto,
makes them a utility, it is not particularly relevant to issues being explored in
this Article, other than to note that some investors, for a variety of reasons, might
be deterred because they do not wish to be subjected to state utility regulation. It
should also be noted that even if a transmission company were not state regulated, it is almost inevitably subject to FERC jurisdiction. See 16 U.S.C. § 824
(2006) (extending FERC jurisdiction over interstate transmission for resale).
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With the possible exception of Colorado,"l 9 all of the state
siting statutes detailed in this Article permit non-utilities to
apply to site transmission lines but take a far more restrictive
position in regard to the use of eminent domain to acquire the
right of way. 120 In Colorado, utilities are expressly granted the
ability to exercise condemnation rights, but non-utilities that
are not expressly granted the power of eminent domain lack
condemnation rights. 12 1 New Mexico similarly permits only
public utilities to exercise eminent domain powers. 122 It should
be noted, however, that New Mexico has created the
NMRETA,1 23 a state transmission authority created for the express purpose of providing transmission service for the export
While the
of the state's renewable energy generation.
NMRETA statute did not create any new powers of eminent
domain, as an agency of the state, it can, in fact exercise condemnation powers in order to obtain needed right of way.
Similarly, in Utah, the statute explicitly permits the state to
use eminent domain powers to build power lines, and the statute does not set any limits on what type of transmission builder may benefit from the state's exercise of that power.124 In
Wyoming, utilities may use condemnation, but only after
obtaining a CPCN.125 Wyoming's WIA may use eminent
domain powers to acquire a right of way for new transmission,
although it may not use those powers to acquire existing
assets. 126
In terms of advancing the interests of individual states as
energy exporters, the ability of both utilities and non-utilities
to receive siting permits for transmission is, for the reasons
noted above, advantageous. Other than in Colorado, the states
detailed in this Article have positioned themselves well from a
legal point of view to attract capital from non-traditional
sources, such as merchant investors, into the transmission
sector. Not only does permitting non-utilities to invest in

119. This distinction may be less meaningful than it appears because Colorado
broadly defines who may become a utility. See supra note 60 and accompanying
text.
120. For purposes of this Article, the authors use the terms "eminent domain"
and "condemnation" interchangeably and synonymously.
121. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 32-12-125, 38-1-202(2)(e) (2009).
122. N.M. STAT. § 62-1-4 (2004).
123. Id. § 62-16A.
124. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-501(8) (2008).
125. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-815, § 1-26-816 (2009).
126. Id. § 37-5-304.
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transmission open access to new capital, but it also removes
the question of building transmission for exporting energy from
the complexities of local utility ratemaking and related cost
and/or risk allocations. In creating a state agency to build
transmission to facilitate the export of their energy, New Mexico (renewable energy only) and Wyoming have gone a step
beyond the other two states, in that they have created specialpurpose entities with the ability to obtain siting permits and
construct facilities using lower-cost public finance mechanisms.1 2 7
In regard to eminent domain, all four states, other than
perhaps Wyoming in a hybrid way, follow the route of an overwhelming majority of states by providing public utilities the
power to exercise condemnation powers, but not permitting
other successful siting applicants, other than state-owned entities such as NMRETA and WIA, to use them. Wyoming has a
hybrid status because it allows for utilities to exercise eminent
domain powers to build transmission, but only after receiving a
CPCN.12 8 In a minority of states, eminent domain is acquired
through the CPCN process, thus enabling all successful applicants to exercise powers most states only vest in utilities. 129
Wyoming, alone among the four states discussed in this Article,
follows that path, but only in a limited sense because it only
applies to utilities and not to non-utilities that obtain a

CPCN.13 0
B. Climate Change
Heightened attention to climate change is another development that is challenging the traditional public utility model
and its accompanying understanding of the public interest in
siting. Many renewable resources, such as wind and solar, are
geographically distant from the large load centers that may
need them. T. Boone Pickens, for instance, highlighted the
need to build massive transmission infrastructure to allow development of new wind turbine fields in Texas as, without such
infrastructure, generating facilities are isolated and unable to
127. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 32.07(1) (2006) ("A certificate of public convenience and necessity issued under s. 196.491 (3) shall constitute the determination
of the necessity of the taking for any lands or interests described in the certificate.").
130. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.B.
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reach customers.131 Likewise, precious wind resources in the
Dakotas and the Rockies will only be able to reach customer
bases if massive new transmission facilities are built. 132
As with wholesale markets, most state siting statutes
simply fail to consider the broader implications of greenhouse
gas emissions. States do give an occasional nod to RPS goals,
but explicit contemplation of the consideration of climate
change and renewable energy goals is largely foreign to state
siting statutes. As is discussed above, siting determinations in
most states historically look to need for power based on specific
physical definitions of what is required to provide service to incumbent customers. To the extent environmental impacts may
be taken into account in state siting proceedings, historically
these have been limited to local impact concerns, such as the
local pollution impacts many states regulate. However, in contrast to a physical and economic claim of need to benefit instate customers, climate change presents a "new" need for
transmission, one that is based on a claim of need to benefit
out-of-state suppliers, new-entrant energy supply firms, whose
plans are consistent with meeting environmental policy objectives, and out-of-state customers. In addition, the environmental aspects of siting transmission to address climate change
goals challenge the parochial, more narrowly (i.e., locally) defined interests state siting statutes were designed to support.
While states do take into account traditional environmental
harms, these are frequently limited to local environmental
harms such as conventional pollutants and their impact on a
state's population. 133 Broader out-of-state interests in mitigating the future harms associated with the energy economy are
simply
beyond
the
scope
of
most
state
siting
131. T. Boone Pickens proposed building as many as 4000 MW of wind turbines
in the state of Texas. One acknowledged barrier to developing such a large wind
turbine project is the lack of transmission lines in areas of the state that have
strong wind resources. Elizabeth Souder, T. Boone Pickens Plans Power Play
With Huge Texas Panhandle Wind Farm,DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 15, 2008,
at 1D, availableat http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/stories/DNpickenswind_15bus.ART.State.Edition1.4687df7.html.
132. Green Power Express has proposed building such a facility in the Midwest
to serve portions of North Dakota, Minnesota, South Dakota, Iowa, Wisconsin,
Illinois, and Indiana. Katie Howell, "Green Power Express" Gains Federal Rate
Incentives, GREENWIRE, Apr. 13, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/
2009/04/13/1; see also Matthew Wald, Giving the Power Grid Some Backbone, ScI.
AM., Mar. 2009, at 52-57, available at http://www.scientificamerican.coml/
article.cfm?id=giving-the-power-grid-some-backbone&page=2.
133. For example, New Mexico explicitly contemplates the consideration of
local environmental impacts. N.M. STAT. § 62-9-3 (2004).
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statutes, and few statutes have been updated to explicitly take
into account an increased dependence on renewable resources
to address climate change concerns. For example, Colorado,
Utah, and Wyoming's siting statutes 34 do not contain any explicit reference to climate change goals. As discussed below,135
however, by beginning to acknowledge interstate concerns New
Mexico has been more innovative in this regard.
In the context of states looking to export their energy production, as well as to contribute to the overall environmental
goals of both their states and to the country, it is more useful to
examine the broader effects that new transmission will have
and what criteria states will employ to examine those effects.
In particular, how will the fact that states are looking to export
energy produced from renewable resources, primarily wind,
impact siting decisions? Perhaps it is useful to view the issue
as how siting officials will view the positive non-economic characteristics of renewable energy. With regards to benefits such
as emissions (carbon and otherwise), national security, and resource conservation, wind and most other renewables have
much potential. Ideally, state siting officials contemplating
authorization of the construction of lines providing those
resources access to the market place would consider such benefits; however, if state officials lack statutory authorization to
consider such factors, it is not likely that they will do so.
None of the four states on which this Article is focusedand, as far as we are aware, no state nationally-explicitly requires siting officials to consider carbon emissions or other
broader air quality issues, as opposed to local, or in-state, impacts that they are generally required to consider, in making
decisions to plan or site transmission. None of the siting statutes surveyed in this Article includes an explicit reference to
climate change, and in particular the out-of-state environmental effects of greenhouse gas emissions. It is also noteworthy
that none of the statutes surveyed for this Article makes direct
reference to the impact that a proposed line could have on the
resource mix being used to generate energy, 136 although both
134. See supra Part I.
135. See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
136. Very few, if any, states require transmission siting officials to think about
the generation mix they may be enabling. Part of the reason for that is that, given the dynamic nature of the grid and changing fleets of generators, it is probably
impossible for siting officials to know that information with any degree of precision. It is interesting to point out, however, that when article co-author Ashley
Brown was an Ohio Commissioner, he was involved in discussions about the sale
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Colorado and New Mexico have a mandatory RPS,137 and Utah
recently enacted a voluntary one. 138 While it may promote
some renewable power and climate change goals, having an
RPS goal, or incorporating RPS-related considerations into the
relevant considerations for transmission planning and siting, is
not sufficient for purposes of developing the export of renewable sources. Even where RPS exists, it is applied to how the
energy procured andlor produced by the jurisdictional utilities
for sale to its jurisdictional customers is generated, rather than
to what energy is produced within the state. 139 There are no
statutory admonitions to siting officials to be mindful of environmental effects other than those within each state's boundaries, no mention of assisting other states to meet their RPS objectives, nor even of taking advantage of the economies of scale
in generation that might be taken advantage of by selling energy across multiple jurisdictions.
As concerns rise regarding climate change, as interest in
renewable energy escalates, and as reliance on bulk power
markets for supply grows, the siting laws and criteria for considering the environmental and other non-economic impacts of
siting new transmission in many states appear to be increasingly obsolete. Many state siting statutes remain in a bit of a
time warp, adopted based on assumptions associated with vertically integrated monopolies, indifference to the sources of
energy, and primarily local environmental impacts. Whether
in practice siting officials can move beyond that framework
without further legislative authorization depends not only on
their initiative and policy objectives, but also on how much
of energy from the Midwest to the East Coast, during which Pennsylvania officials, who would have had to site lines to carry that commerce, argued strenuously that the net effect would be to produce more S02, NOx, and C02 emissions than
if East Coast states produced their own energy.
137. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124 (2009); N.M. STAT. § 62-15-1.
138. UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-17-602 (2008).
139. In addition, many states, including each of these three, permit trading of
Renewable Energy Credits or their equivalent. See DSIRE: Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Colorado Incentives/Policies for Renewables
& Efficiency, http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?IncentiveCode=
C024R (last visited Mar. 16, 2010); New Mexico Public Regulation Commission,
http://www.nmprc.state.nm.us/renewable.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2010); DSIRE:
Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Utah Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency, http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/
incentive.cfm?Incentive Code=UT13R&re=l&ee=l (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
As a result, actual renewable power not only need not be generated in the state,
but need not be delivered at all to the actual purchaser of the energy with green
attributes or possibly even into the state's borders.
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leeway the courts will provide them, or how much new direction their legislators will give them. Certainly, there are public
policy reasons for state siting officials to take a broader
perspective, but since siting decisions are governed by statutes
passed by legislative bodies, much depends on how such
authority is interpreted by siting officials and state courts.

C. Expansion of FederalAuthority Over Transmission
Congress has responded to some of the concerns about
state authority over expanding transmission line siting. In
2005, Congress added "backstop" authority, authorizing FERC
to preempt state siting authorities to expand transmission in
limited regions of the country facing transmission constraints. 140 Proposals to expand FERC's transmission authority are also pending before Congress as a part of the climate
change legislation that is supported by the Obama Administration. 14 1 There is an obvious irony in the context of the current
debate in Congress over whether there should be federal
preemption of the states in regard to transmission siting: while
much of the states' political opposition to the expansion of federal siting authority focuses on arguments against preemption
of local authority, the irony is that states themselves only
acquired siting powers by expressly preempting local jurisdictions.
In the 2005 Energy Policy Act, 14 2 Congress amended the
Federal Power Act, for the first time delegating authority to
Department of Energy ("DOE") to designate National Interest
Energy Transmission Corridors ("NIETCs") and to FERC to exercise some "backstop" permitting authority over states within
the NIETCs. 14 3 According to these amendments, DOE "may
designate any geographic area experiencing electric energy
transmission capacity constraints or congestion that adversely
affects consumers as a national interest electric transmission
corridor."1 44 In compliance with the 2005 Energy Policy Act,
140. See infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 177-86 and accompanying text.
142. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
143. 16 U.S.C. § 8 2 4p (2006).
144. Id. § 824p(a)(2). Section 216(a)(4) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
amending 16 U.S.C. § 824p, provides specifics as to what the Secretary may consider in designating the corridors. Id. § 824p(a)(4)(B)-(E). Generally, the DOE
may consider the economic effects of inadequate or unreasonably priced electricity
within the corridor and in the end markets served by the corridor. Id. It may also
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DOE completed its study of transmission congestion in August
of 2006, and in 2007 it published draft designations of the MidAtlantic and Western National Interest Energy Corridors
based on the study.145 The statute also requires the Secretary
of Energy to consult with the states and conduct a study of
electric transmission congestion every three years following the
initial NIETC designation.146
Although the scope of FERC's backstop authority is geographically limited exclusively to the corridors specifically
identified by DOE,14 7 there are also limits on when FERC can
exercise its authority within the NIETCs. Construction permits for transmission within NIETCs can be issued by federal
regulators, irrespective of the traditional state authority over

consider whether "a diversification of supply is warranted;" whether "the energy
independence of the United States would be served by the designation;" whether
"the designation would be in the interest of national energy policy;" and whether
"the designation would enhance national defense and homeland security." Id.
Section 216(a)(4)(B)(i) of the Energy Policy Act also allows the Secretary to consider whether "economic growth in the corridor, or the end markets served by the
corridor, may be jeopardized by reliance on limited sources of energy, and [whether diversification of supply, energy independence, national energy policy, national
defense, and homeland security would be served]." Id. § 824p(a)(4)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
145. Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability; Draft National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor Designations, 72 Fed. Reg. 25,838 (May 7,
2007). In October 2007, the DOE issued its final designations of the corridors.
National Electric Transmission Congestion Report, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,992-02 (Oct. 5,
2007). A pending case before the Ninth Circuit challenges the degree to which
DOE can rely on renewable resources in designating NIETC's. Wilderness Soc'y
v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, No. 08-71074 (9th Cir. filed Mar. 13, 2008). The filing of
this lawsuit is interesting because it points out a schism among environmentalists
in regard to building new transmission. See id. At the risk of being a bit simplistic, the debate divides the environmental community. The schism is between
those whose focus is primarily on air quality (including carbon emissions) and
who want to reduce dependence on fossil fuels on one hand, and those who are
more focused on land and water issues (e.g., wildlife and vegetation) and concerned about the proliferation of generators (including wind turbines) and transmission lines across the landscape on the other. Air quality advocates want to see
more wind generation and other renewable resources and want to ensure that
there is sufficient transmission to link "clean energy" to load centers. Land and
water quality advocates, on the other hand, prefer to see generation built closer to
load centers and find barriers to the construction of power lines useful in the
achievement of their policy objectives. Thus, one group of environmentalists prefers to facilitate the construction of more transmission, while another seeks to restrict it.

146. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)(1).
147. See Eric W. Struble, Comment, National Interest Electric Transmission
Corridors: Will State Regulators Remain Relevant?, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 575,
579 (2008) (concluding that practically the 2005 amendments to the FPA only
constitute federal preemption in certain states).
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transmission siting, if one of the following three sets of conditions designated in the statute are met. First, FERC can override the state if the "State in which the transmission facilities
are to be constructed or modified does not have authority to
approve the siting of the facilities,"1 4 8 or cannot "consider the
interstate benefits expected to be achieved by the proposed
construction or modification of transmission facilities in the
State."1 49 Second, FERC can override the state if "the applicant . .. does not qualify to apply for a permit or siting approval . . . because the applicant does not serve end-use customers

in the State."1 5 0 Third, FERC can override the state if a state
commission with authority to approve the facility has either
"withheld approval for more than 1 year,"15 1 or has conditioned
its approval so that the construction will not "significantly reduce transmission congestion in interstate commerce or is not
economically feasible." 152
If FERC determines that one of these statutorily specified
criteria is satisfied, FERC may override a state commission,
and issues a construction permit (which would include the
power to exercise eminent domain in a federal district court) 153
but only if additional conditions are present. Specifically, the
facilities must be used for the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce; 154 the contemplated construction must be
"consistent with the public interest";1 5 5 it must be expected to
"significantly reduce transmission congestion in interstate
commerce and protect[ ] or benefit[ ] consumers"; 156 it must be
"consistent with sound national energy policy" and expected to
"enhance energy independence;"1 5 7 and finally, it must be expected to "maximize, to the extent reasonable and economical,
the transmission capabilities of existing towers or structures." 158 To date, only one application to exercise FERC's
backstop authority has been received by FERC; that

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(1)(A)(i).
Id. § 824p(b)(1)(A)(ii).
Id. § 824p(b)(1)(B).
Id. § 824p(b)(1)(C)(i).
Id. § 824p(b)(1)(C)(ii).
Id. § 824p(e).
Id. § 824p(b)(2).
Id. § 824p(b)(3).
Id. § 824p(b)(4).
Id. § 824p(b)(5).
Id. § 824p(b)(6).
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application was withdrawn and the agency has yet to exercise
its backstop authority in a single case. 159
Despite Congress' expansion of transmission siting authority in 2005, it is widely perceived that FERC's authority over
transmission might not be sufficient to allow transmission siting approval in certain areas of the country.160 Concerns have
focused on the fact that many renewable resources, the development of which would depend on transmission, are located
outside of DOE's geographically defined NIETCs. 161 According
to FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff, "[w]e need a National policy commitment to develop the extra-high voltage ("EHV")
transmission infrastructure to bring renewable energy from
remote areas where it is produced most efficiently into our
large metropolitan areas where most of this Nation's power is
consumed." 62
In addition, FERC's statutory authority under the 2005
amendments to the Federal Power Act has been narrowly construed by federal courts, calling into question the scope of
FERC's authority in certain instances. In Piedmont Environmental Council v. FERC,163 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit interpreted FERC's siting authority narrowly.
Specifically, at issue in that case was the language of the statute that authorizes FERC to override a state and issue a construction permit, including the power of eminent domain, if a
state commission with authority to approve the facility has
"withheld approval for more than [one] year."1 64 FERC initially interpreted this statutory language to authorize the agency
to exercise its backstop authority in instances where a state
regulator had explicitly denied an application.1 65 However,
159. See Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Transmission Line Siting
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/siting/
Requests,
Prefiling
prefiling-req.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
160. See supra notes 131 and accompanying text (mentioning T. Boone
Pickens's concerns); see also CTR. FOR Am. PROGRESS, WIRED FOR PROGRESS:
BUILDING A NATIONAL CLEAN ENERGY SMART GRID 24 (2009).

161. Wellinghoff Sees Big FERC Role Supporting Obama Green Energy Goals,
ENERGY WASH., Dec. 30, 2008, at 3, available at http://www.ferc.gov/about/commem/wellinghoff/12-30-08-energy-washington.pdf.
162. Hearing on Legis. Regarding Electric Transmission Lines Before the S.
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Jon
Wellinghoff, Acting Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) [hereinafter Wellinghoff Senate Testimony].
163. Piedmont Envtl. Council v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 558 F.3d 304
(4th Cir. 2009).
164. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(1)(C)(i) (2006).
165. Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 311.
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relying on its characterization of the plain language of the statute, the Piedmont panel resolved the issue at Chevron's step
one, 166 interpreting the language of Section 216 of the FPA to
preclude FERC from exercising its transmission siting backstop authority where an application to build a transmission
line has been denied (as opposed to approval withheld, as explicitly mentioned in the statute) by state regulators within one
year. 16 7 The Court reasoned that the phrase "withheld approval for more than one year"1 68 does not, read by itself, include
the "outright denial of a permit application within the one-year
deadline." 169 The decision was not unanimous. The dissent argued that the majority misread the language of the statute and
the 2005 amendments to the FPA, and that FERC's interpretation of the FPA is entitled to Chevron step two deference. 170
Both FERC's request for rehearing en banc and its petition for
certiorari were denied. 17 1
The Fourth Circuit Piedmont decision involves only one of
the multiple statutory grounds that Congress allowed FERC to
rely on in exercising its backstop authority. However, some interpret the decision as seriously hobbling FERC's ability to implement its backstop authority.172 As Chairman Wellinghoff
166. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984). Chevron, of course, laid down a two-step process for courts reviewing
agency legal interpretations. At step one (which the majority focused on in Piedmont) a court first determines whether Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear that is the end of the matter." Id. On the other hand, if the court concludes that "the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific [question]," the court moves on to step two,
at which point it defers to the agency's construction of the statute in question if
the construction is permissible. Id. at 843.
167. Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 315 (reversing FERC's interpretation of the language of the Federal Power Act siting backstop authority to include the denial of
the applications, and limiting its language to "withheld approval for more than
one year").
168. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(1)(C)(i).
169. Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 315.
170. Id. at 323 (Traxler, J., dissenting).
171. Petition of Respondent FERC for Rehearing En Banc, Piedmont, 558 F.3d
304, No. 07-1651 (4th Cir. Apr. 2, 2009); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Edison
Elec. Inst. v. Piedmont Envtl. Council, 2010 WL 154946, No. 09-343 (U.S. Jan. 19,
2010).
172. In fact, it is questionable that it does so in a manner that will preclude the
exercise of backstop authority in most instances. FERC has other statutory
grounds that it can invoke to preempt a state, assuming the state does not deny
an application and comply with those specific criteria. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b). FERC
and DOE also retain authority to expand NIETCs. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a). Even after Piedmont, a significant amount of backstop power remains with federal authorities. For further discussion, see Rossi, supra note 96, at 1033-35.
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has stated, "[the Piedmont] court's ruling is a significant constraint on the Commission's already-limited ability to approve
appropriate projects to transmit energy in interstate commerce."1 73 For example, the only Section 216 proceeding initiated at FERC-Southern California Edison's application to
build the Arizona portion of the Devers-Palo Verde No. 2
projectl 74-seems to involve a denial of an application (rather
than a state withholding approval), and it is unclear the extent
to which any of the other criteria17 5 that would trigger FERC
backstop authority are present. In any event, FERC will not
get to decide the question(s) in that proceeding, since the company has decided to withdraw its application from consideration. 176

In response to such concerns, several proposals pending before Congress would further expand FERC's authority to
preempt state and local land use decisions related to electric
These include a large-scale climate
power transmission.
change bill approved by the House of Representatives 177 and
two proposals pending before the Senate.1 7 8
The House of Representatives has adopted landmark climate change legislation, The American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009 (commonly known as the "WaxmanMarkey" bill) that, among other things, 179 endorses a regional
transmission planning model and includes the expansion of
federal "backstop" authority over transmission. The bill proposes regional planning entities for transmission and puts in
place a system of FERC review of these plans for consistency
with transmission planning principles.180 These principles,
which FERC would need to develop, will "facilitate the deployment of renewable and other zero-carbon and low-carbon
173. Wellinghoff Senate Testimony, supra note 162, at 5-6.
174. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text (noting other criteria
FERC may use to invoke its backstop powers).
176. Edison Drops Plan for Power Line in Arizona, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/16/business/fi-edisonl6;Southern California
Edison Will Not See License to Construct Transmission Line in Arizona at this
Time, TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION WORLD, May 18, 2009, http://tdworld.com/
overhead transmission/socal-edison-cancels-transmission-license-0509/.
177. See infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
178. See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
179. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009). Waxman-Markey also adopts a controversial cap and trade program to
begin to price carbon emissions and adopts a national renewable energy portfolio
standard. See id. § 101 (renewable energy standard); id. § 721 (cap & trade).
180. Id. § 151.
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energy sources for generating electricity to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions while ensuring reliability, reducing congestion,
ensuring cyber-security, minimizing environmental harm, and
providing for cost-effective electricity services throughout the
United States."18 1 Other provisions expand FERC's backstop
authority, but the primary scope of the expansion of federal authority in Waxman-Markey is curiously limited to Western
Interconnection states and does not expand FERC's power over
transmission for Eastern Interconnection states, ERCOT,
Alaska, or Hawaii. Under the Waxman-Markey bill, if a state
fails to approve the construction and routing within one year of
an application that is consistent with a regional plan on file
with FERC, rejects the application, or imposes 'unreasonable'
conditions on the project, FERC may preempt a transmission
application and issue its own Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity;182 this overrules the effects of the Fourth CirHowever, given that Waxmancuit's Piedmont decision.
Markey embraces far greater preemptive effect in Western
states, FERC's power to exercise backdrop siting authority will
vary depending on which region of the country a proposed
transmission project is located in.
In the Senate, which has yet to seriously take up broader
climate change legislation, including controversial carbon pricing measures such as cap and trade, a couple of pending standalone bills could address transmission and other renewable
issues. Senator Bingaman has proposed the American Clean
Energy Leadership Act of 2009, a transmission bill that cleared
the Senate Energy and Natural Resource Committee in July
2009.183 Bingaman's bill overrules the effects of Piedmont, but
unlike Waxman-Markey it does not distinguish between eastern and western states in defining FERC's backstop authority.
In addition, Bingaman's bill authorizes FERC to allocate the
costs of new transmission projects, although a controversial
amendment to this provision (known as the "Corker amendment") only allows FERC to allocate transmission costs to customers once it determines "the costs are reasonably proportionate to measurable economic and reliability benefits."1 84 An

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009, S. 1462, 111th Cong.
(2009).
184. Id. § 121. The Corker amendment superseded previous language in
Bingaman's bill, which would have precluded regional cost allocation if
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alternative bill sponsored by Senator Reid, the majority leader,
would allow DOE to designate "national renewable energy
zones" based on locations that are capable of generating more
than 1000 megawatts of renewable energy. 185 His approach
basically retains the primary role of states in siting transmission lines, while expanding FERC's backstop authority in such
areas. 186
III. EVOLVING THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" TO NEW MARKET
CONDITIONS

Part III emphasizes the need for a new definition of the
public interest that might allow state regulators to retain their
relevance under these new market circumstances and highlights the two main barriers to this: (1) legislative inertia; and
(2) an outdated cost-allocation model. The public interest under some state siting statutes may be sufficiently capacious to
give siting authorities some flexibility to evolve, but in other
instances legislative action may be needed. In addition, the
state cost-of-service model and cost allocations must evolve to a
more regional approach to allocating the costs of new transmission.
A. An Evolving Understandingof Need
The traditional definition of need, as noted above, has been
excessively inward looking-in the sense that it is highly focused on what is needed to serve the electricity demand of the
consumers within the state and/or within the scope of a single
utility system.187 That perspective is rooted in the old industry
model of vertically-integrated, largely insular, monopolies. It is
almost completely outdated in the context of competitive, multistate bulk power markets, in the context of states seeking to
exploit their resources, particularly renewable ones, for export,
and in the context of concerns about more global environmental
impacts, such as climate change. Those changes in the market
structure and in the socio-political milieu of the electricity
"disproportionate to reasonably anticipated benefits." For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part III.D.
185. Clean Renewable Energy and Economic Development Act, S. 539, 111th
Cong. § 3 (2009).
186. Id.
187. See supra Part I.
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industry require policy makers and regulators to take a fresh
look at the defining need for purposes of siting new transmission lines. Ideally, siting officials or regulators possess sufficient discretion under current legal authority to do this on
their own. Given the increasingly dynamic nature of the business, it would be desirable for them to have this discretion,
since going to the legislature every time market or social circumstances change could be quite cumbersome and would
require, in many cases, a major effort to accomplish. Nonetheless, given the outdated notions of need, officials should seek
new statutory authority if they determine it is essential to revise the determinations of need.
One possible approach is for state regulators to not require
an applicant to demonstrate need at all.18 8 This is actually not
as radical as it may seem at first blush. As noted above, need
is an economic concept. In a competitive market, it is extremely unlikely that any firm would take the risk of constructing, or
even making an extensive application proposal for a line if it
were not convinced of the economic opportunity the project
presents. Thus, unless the line is being proposed by a utility
for inclusion in rate base, and the need determination is serving as a proceeding for pre-approval of inclusion in rate base, it
is difficult to see what is accomplished by requiring a public adjudication of need. Indeed, it could well be argued that in the
context of a competitive bulk power market that new transmission would enhance, the more supply options that exist are in
both consumers' and the public's interest. Moreover, the capital at risk is that of the proponent of the line, so the money at
stake is an entirely private matter.
In the case of utilities that seek to put transmission in retail rate base, which is effectively a socialization of the costs
across a narrow spectrum of potential users of the facility (see
further discussion on this question below) 189 , the issue of siting
ought to be completely separate from the question of inclusion

188. This is not to suggest that there ought not be a thorough review of the
non-economic factors (e.g., environmental and other impacts). They are constant
and should always undergo review in a siting process. The absence of a requirement to show need may reduce somewhat the ability of siting officials to take a
relativistic approach of weighing the degree of need against the degree of adverse
consequences, but there certainly should be known criteria that are applicable
and usable in consideration of any application. If an applicant wanted to have the
criteria waived or modified, it would still have the burden of demonstrating why
that request should be granted.
189. See infra Part III.D.
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of a line in rate base. There may clearly be a need for a line to
be built to serve the overall market, but it may not be required
to serve native-load customers. The latter issue goes to cost allocation and not to whether the line itself should be sited.
Thus, if a utility seeks to build a line, it may seek approval. If
it also seeks to include the costs associated with that asset in
its retail rate base, that is an altogether different issue for regulators to determine in a ratemaking or rate-related proceeding. A utility may decide that the revenues derived from use of
the line by non-native load customers will be sufficiently compensatory without rate base inclusion to put its capital at risk,
or it may decide that the risk of non-recovery is too great in the
absence of inclusion in rate base and will choose not to go
ahead with the project.
There is the potential, of course, that failing to pre-approve
need could have an adverse effect on a utility's cost of capital,
given that in many states a need determination may lead to a
presumption that a project's costs will be included in its retail

rate base. Whether that possibility of driving up the cost of
capital actually materializes, however, depends on how state
regulators allocate the residual revenue responsibility for the
facility. The traditional approach of allocating costs and resi-

dual revenue responsibility for new transmission to retail rate
base may actually understate the cost of capital. Using an artificially narrow definition of benefits, based on customers within
a specific firm's jurisdiction, fails to recognize larger risks that
any investor in a transmission line may face, underrepresenting the actual cost of capital for transmission projects
and discouraging new investment in transmission. In addition
to whatever effects this has on cost of capital, it is important to
consider potential construction cost savings, given that transmission projects are rife with the potential for far exceeding
estimates made at the project proposal stage.
If a state does not have the appetite for eliminating the requirement that need be demonstrated, then it should, at a minimum, considerably broaden the perspective and criteria for assessing the need. In today's environment, the insular singlestate, or single-system perspective, which is relevant to the
question of inclusion in rate base, can no longer be justified for
use in siting decisions. Rather, the context for determining
need should explicitly include the following:
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1. The impact of the proposed facility on the regional power
grid and the market being served by it (e.g., effect on competitiveness);
2. The effect of the proposed facility on alleviating constraints, weaknesses, congestion, and other shortcomings on
the existing grid;
3. The effect that the proposed facility will have on the resource mix of generators whose output will be accessible to
consumers (e.g., will it facilitate access of renewable resources to load centers?);
4. Expected regional environmental effects (e.g., reduced
carbon emissions), of the anticipated changed dynamics of
the regional grid after the line is put in service; and
5. The impact of the proposed new line on the state's and
region's economy and economic development.
B. IncreasedAttention To Climate Change
In addition to challenging the need determination, developments in the electric power industry also challenge how state
regulators approach environmental regulation considerations
in transmission siting. In particular, heightened attention to
climate-change aspects of energy challenges state regulators to
widen the horizon of criteria to at least consider fuel mix concerns. Siting new lines in today's milieu requires something
beyond merely traditional service reliability for customers and
necessarily involves broadening environmental focus beyond
the traditional emphasis on local effects.
Historically, state regulators may have considered the fuel
mix and conservation alternatives in siting power plants
primarily for purposes of enhancing reliability and protecting
consumers, or on the environmental front to consider local air
and water quality, as well as other non-economic impacts in
proximity to the proposed facility. 190 However, the fuel mix of
supply options at the aggregate system level, or throughout the
entire grid, was generally not an explicit consideration

190. For example, under Florida's Power Plant Siting Act, in making decisions
to approve the siting of generators, regulators are explicitly instructed to consider
the need for fuel diversity and supply reliability, and whether the proposed plant
is the most cost-effective alternative available. In addition, the agency must consider the "conservation measures taken by or reasonably available to the applicant .

.

. which might mitigate the need for the proposed plant." FLA. STAT.

403.519(3) (2008).
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regulators were required to balance in the siting of transmission lines. 19 1 Many states have adopted RPSs or explicit goals
for the adoption of renewable technologies for the generation of
electric power. 192 The success of such renewable goals, however, depends on the availability of transmission in order to allow these resources to reach major consumer markets in metropolitan areas that are geographically distant from natural
resources. 19 3 Historically, however, transmission siting proceedings have not focused much, if at all, on overall fuel mix
beyond emphasizing fuel diversification as a means to promoting reliability and protecting consumers. While many states
have adopted RPS goals, most of these states do not explicitly
incorporate into their transmission siting statutes any explicit
consideration of RPS goals in planning and siting transmission
lines. Even if they are explicitly acknowledged this may only
be lip service to the larger problem of siting transmission to facilitate growth in a state's renewable power production.194
In addition, state siting statutes have traditionally been
focused on local land use concerns and conventional pollutants
that impose local harms. 19 5 Climate change challenges this
traditional understanding of environmental regulation, which
has focused on addressing local harms. With heightened
awareness to climate change, regulators are increasingly being
called on to consider national, and even the international, impacts of their decisions; an environmental regulation scheme
that may have worked well to preserve local land uses, protect
local uses and conservation goals, and protect against the local
impact of pollutants is challenged to adapt to a new set of problems that focuses on out-of-jurisdiction, not in-jurisdiction,
harms. 196 To be sure, some of the states have been leaders in

191.
192.

See supra Part II.B.
See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text; see also Joshua P.

Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market: The Impact of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard on the U.S. Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L.J. 49
(2008) (surveying various state RPS approaches).

193.

See BRACKEN HENDRICKS,

PROGRESS:

BUILDING

A

NATIONAL

CTR.

FOR AM.

PROGRESS, WIRED FOR

CLEAN-ENERGY

SMART

GRID

(2009),

http://www.americanprogress.orglissues/2009/02/pdflelectricity-grid.pdf.
194. See supra Part II.B.
195. See supra Part I.
196. Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local
Climate Change Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1964 (2007) (arguing that
"think globally, act locally" is not prudent advice for protecting the environment
when "externalities arise from wide-spread and geographically moveable
sources").
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the implementation of climate change legislation;19 7 however,
energy and transmission siting in particular requires states to
reassess their approach.
While transmission line siting authority in most states is
insufficient to address such concerns, some states have explicitly expanded the legal authority of state siting bodies to consider climate change goals, or at least taking steps to reduce carbon emissions. For example, New Mexico has been a leader in
this regard, adopting in 2007 H.B. 188, the New Mexico Renewable Energy Transmission Authority Act. 19 8 While this
statute does not expand state eminent domain power beyond
traditional utilities, it does establish a Renewable Energy
Transmission Authority Board for planning and gives it the
power of eminent domain (not as a new power, but simply as a
consequence of being a state agency), the power to approve taxexempt bonds, and to approve charges to pay for transmission
projects. 199 According to a state agency document at least 30
percent of any new transmission capacity must be for renewable-derived electricity. 2 00 New Mexico's innovative statute parallels the approach of some other states. California has also
explicitly authorized its state regulators to include its renewable portfolio goals in transmission planning and siting, including through the specification of competitive renewable energy
zones for transmission. 20 1 Texas has also endorsed the concept
of competitive renewable energy zones, designed to address in
particular the expansion of the renewable energy economy in
the state. 202
These states seem to focus predominantly on promoting
state-focused goals, and, to the extent such laws allow
197. Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does
This Say about Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 101620 (2006) (briefly surveying state and local initiatives).
198. H.B. 188, 48th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2007) (enacted and codified as
N.M. STAT. § 62-16A (2009)).
199. N.M. STAT. § 62-16A-3 & -4.
200. N.M. Energy, Minerals & Natural Res. Dep't, Fact Sheet on H.B. 188, Renewable
Energy
Transmission
Authority
Act,
http://www.emnrd.state.nm.us/ECMD/LawsRegulationsExecutiveOrders/documen
ts/HB-188-RETA-fact-sheet-07.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
201. California Energy Commission, Renewable Energy Transmission Initiative, http://www.energy.ca.gov/retilindex.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
202. See Public Utility Commission of Texas, Competitive Renewable Energy
Zones, http://www.puc.state.tx.us/rules/subrules/electric/25.174/25.1 74ei.cfm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2010); see also TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.904 (2007) (containing
the relevant statutory provisions in the Texas Public Utility Regulatory Act).
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consideration of out-of-state benefits in siting transmission,
they appear to remain the exception and not the rule. A net
power consuming state such as California is likely to see its
main goals as diversifying resources beyond traditional fossil
fuels, conserving energy, and sparking development of new renewable energy startups. A net energy producing state, such
as New Mexico, is more likely to see its main goal as encouraging economic development of a renewable energy sector based
on natural resources, whether they are located in urban or
rural areas. There may be obstacles if consumer and producer
interests are not aligned across jurisdictions, and in many
instances producer interests are not sufficiently strong in the
renewable sector to support legislative reform that advocates
changes to state laws regarding transmission to allow renewable resources to flourish.
Moreover, even where individual states have reformed
transmission siting laws, often the effectiveness of transmission reforms depends on the discretion of state regulators who
continue to adhere to the traditional understandings of the
public interest embedded in the model of vertical integration of
the traditional public utility. Any individual state's reform efforts can be hobbled if neighboring states do not incorporate
similar considerations into their transmission siting laws. For
example, even if New Mexico does include broad considerations
such as the development and export of renewable resources into its siting statutes, its effort to effectively reach markets such
as California could be thwarted if a state such as Arizona adheres to a limited definition of the public interest in siting statutes and refuses to allow the siting of a transmission line to
transport New Mexico power to California. As a physical matter, Arizona and other states may not favor treating transmission as nothing more than a conduit for out-of-state interests.
Out of state electrons will likely be intermingled onto a grid
that benefits Arizona customers. However, if Arizona adheres
to a narrower definition of the public interest than does New
Mexico or California, Arizona producers could use their market
power over transmission to exclude competition from New Mexico producers and to capture rents that could benefit California
consumers.
Finally, it is not sufficient for state siting statutes to merely incorporate or mimic RPS goals. RPS goals typically focus
on electricity purchases and sales, not on power production
within a state. In addition, with tradable renewable energy
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credits there is no guarantee that renewable power will flow into a state at all. If the goal is to truly encourage development
of a state's renewable natural resources, a state RPS goal
alone, or consideration of a state RPS in transmission siting
decisions, is not an effective means to that end, and a broader
approach to transmission needs to be taken.

C. State Statutory/RegulatoryInertiaand Legal Barriers
Many of the barriers to siting lines that would improve
competitiveness on the western bulk power markets also improve access for energy exporting states, increase market opportunities for renewable resources-particularly wind-and
contribute to economic development in the states affected are
rooted in state law and/or regulation. One of the most significant-but under-discussed-barriers relates to how states provide for cost-recovery for transmission investments, given that
with wholesale competition and heightened attention to climate
change it is increasingly likely that those who would benefit
from new transmission will not be the same customers who
would bear the costs under traditional rate regulation. 2 03
To illustrate the problem, consider the following example.
A line designed to transmit New Mexico's renewable energy into California would have to cross Arizona, so an Arizona utility
may seek to site a line to accommodate that energy flow. 204
Arizona may already have little incentive to approve the line
because the benefits primarily go to the sellers and buyers in
neighboring states, while the physical effects of the line will be
predominantly felt in Arizona, a state that is not intended to be
a beneficiary. If the Arizona utility then seeks to put the new
facility in its retail rate base, the native load customers of the
Arizona utility will have to pay for it, or, at least stand ready to
pay for it if the off-system use of the facility was less than fully

203. See Rossi, supra note 96, at 1044-48, for further discussion of the cost allocation and transmission pricing issue and its potential implications for investment in transmission.
204. While the issue of who is eligible to apply to site a new transmission line
is discussed above in regard to the four states discussed in this Article, it is important to note that in some states, only utilities are eligible to apply, so their
participation would be mandatory. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So.2d 428
(Fla. 2000), for an example of where this is the case, at least in regard to generation. Obviously, where an incumbent utility is the only eligible party to build a
line, the issue of rate treatment for that line becomes even more critical to obtaining siting approval.

HeinOnline -- 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 755 2010

756

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

compensatory to the local utility. 205 That possibility turns
what is already an incentive to reject the line into a virtual
economic mandate to do so for Arizona siting officials. 206
From the perspective of New Mexico, a net power exporting state, there also may be strong incentives to reject the line
if it imposes costs on native customers. For example, if the
NMPRC were to include the interconnections to generation for
export in the rate base of a jurisdictional utility (when the facility is to be used primarily to export power out of state and provide the utility's customers little benefit) it is likely that there
would be significant opposition to the siting of the line from
customers who do not wish to subsidize the exporters of electric
power. While this example is purely hypothetical, the possibility of it occurring, in the West or elsewhere in the U.S., is not
insignificant. 207
Setting aside the question of correct price signals, as well
as the basic ratemaking principle that the cost-causer should
be the one who pays, and examining the issue solely from the
perspective of siting decisions, the allocation of costs among
users has an enormous impact on how the siting process will
occur. 208 Imposing costs on non-beneficiaries will make siting
205. In the example, the Arizona utility would almost certainly not want to be
involved in such a project unless it was assured of full revenue recovery. If the
full recovery would be from the buyers and sellers in the contemplated transaction, the utility might entertain involvement, but if full recovery meant having to
seek inclusion of the new line in retail rate base, the utility might still defer on
the basis of not wanting to use up political capital and goodwill to get the project
approved.
206. In fact, Arizona regulators rejected the proposed Devers Palo Verde 2
(even though all of its costs would have been borne by Southern California Edison) ostensibly because of environmental impact, although many suspect the real
reason was because of fear that California's thirst for energy would increase demand to the point that Arizona consumers would experience rising electricity
prices as a result. So. Cal. Edison Co., Case No. 130, Decision No. 69638 (Ariz.
Corp. Comm'n June 6, 2007), available at http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/docket
pdfl0000073735.pdf. One can only imagine the situation if Arizonans were also
being asked to pay for the line. The same line was approved by the California
Public Utilities Commission. So. Cal. Edison Co., Decision No. 07-01-040 (Cal.
Pub. Utils. Comm'n Jan. 25, 2007), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/
FINALDECISION/64017.pdf.
207. It is also important to keep in mind in this example that there is a risk
that the siting officials involved may have a higher hurdle for economic transmission than they do for transmission for what they deem to be reliability. See supra
note 1.
208. The issues of price signals and cross subsidies for renewables, or any other resource, are not being set aside in this Article because the authors believe
them to be insignificant. They are important, but they are simply beyond the
scope of this Article, which focuses primarily on siting issues.
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lines in states located between sellers and buyers (already a
difficult task) even more problematic, and may even have similar consequences in the selling state. While placing transmission used primarily for the export of a state's resources in the
retail rate base may provide financial comfort for the utilities
undertaking the construction, that benefit may well be offset by
the opposition of those being asked to bear the residual revenue
risk for that line, despite its perceived negligible benefits for
them, in the event that the revenues from the off-system use of
the line do not cover its full costs. Both New Mexico, in its creation of NMRETA, and Wyoming, with its WIA, appear to recognize this problem and have attempted to surmount it, while
maintaining a competitive advantage, through the use of lower
cost public finance. 20 9
Apart from whether transmission is included in retail
rate base, there is the issue of allocating costs among all affected parties in a given region. This is a vexing problem, even
in regions with mechanisms for regional transmission planning
and even more difficult where regional planning processes do
not exist. Some contend that it is the inability to resolve cost
allocation controversies that have stymied the construction of
additional transmission even more than siting problems have.
For the most part, however, the inability to resolve cost allocation issues has surfaced in instances where the utilities, or,
perhaps, other investors, fail to agree between themselves as to
who should bear what portion of the costs associated with a
proposed line. The most likely result of such a stalemate is
that the proposed line will never come to be, rather than that it
will encounter problems being sited.21 0 Where the utilities are
in agreement about the risks and costs of a line, it is the customers who are likely to bear a line's costs; where customers
who do not see benefits are called upon to pay, such a line may
generate strong resistance in the siting process that has little
to do with either need or environmental harm.
209. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (discussing New Mexico);
supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing Wyoming). To the extent that
these agencies directly exercise the power of eminent domain as a public agency,
rather than granting it to a privately-owned utility, they may be able to take advantage of lower cost public financing of transmission, such as through taxexempt bonds.
210. If multiple users will need to build a line for shared use purposes and they
cannot agree between themselves, it is less likely that a line will be proposed in
the first instance than where the likely users of a line agree in advance regarding
who will share the risks and costs associated with constructing the line.
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For those states looking to export their energy resources,
however, the inability to find means of resolving cost allocation
disputes can constitute just as much of a barrier to the business plans as to siting a line. In regions with regional transmission organizations ("RTOs") there is a recognized framework for joint planning and trying to resolve cost allocation
disputes. 2 11 The issue is often more complicated in regions that
lack organized markets and planning processes. It is important for states looking to export their energy production to assure that cost allocation methodologies are clear, and, if not,
that there is a workable mechanism for resolving them on a
timely basis. It is worth noting that the four states are in two
different interstate groups established, at least in part, to resolve cost allocation issues in transmission. Utah and Wyoming are in the footprint of the Northern Tier Transmission
Group ("NTTG"),212 while Colorado and New Mexico utilities
and regulators are part of WestConnect. 213 For each of these
states it is important that they make sure they are able to
resolve cost allocation issues across the entire region into
which they intend to sell energy. It may be of lesser value to
have regional arrangements with some states, or among utilities in some states, if those states or companies only cover some
of the market region in which energy will be traded. Generally,
the larger the footprint for resolving cost allocation issues, the
fewer seams or other distortions one will encounter in planning
transmission, and, once it is built, in trading on the wholesale
market.
With regard to the states of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah,
and Wyoming, there are a variety of changes to law and/or regulation that would greatly facilitate the states achieving their
211. See infra Part III.D for discussion of such approaches.
212. As the NTTG web site describes:
The Northern Tier Transmission Group (NTTG) is a group of transmission providers and customers that are actively involved in the sale and
purchase of transmission capacity of the power grid that delivers electricity to customers in the Northwest and Mountain States. Transmission owners serving this territory work in conjunction with state
governments, customers, and other stakeholders to improve the operations of and chart the future for the grid that links all of these service
territories.
See Northern Tier Transmission Group, http://www.nttg.biz/site/ (last visited Feb.
12, 2010).
213. See WestConnect, Members and Steering Committee, http://www.west
connect.com/aboutsteeringcomm.php (last visited Feb. 12, 2010) (listing Colorado
and New Mexico utilities and regulators as members).
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objectives of promoting environmentally sustainable economic
growth. One of those changes has already been discussed
above: namely, changing the way in which need is defined for
purposes of siting within individual states. However, a number
of additional reforms are necessary to laws in these states, or
in other states that follow a similar approach.
To begin, state preemption of local government decisionmaking powers in the siting process can greatly facilitate
transmission siting. New Mexico has already preempted local
authorities. 2 14 While the other states have proscribed local
powers in a variety of ways, the requirements for submitting
multiple applications and, perhaps, multiple proceedings with
the potential for conflicting results and endless demands for
concessions, is both daunting and costly. Local governments
should have input into the process, but not a veto or absolute
decision-making power.
In addition, facilitation of the process would also be served
by creating a single, uniform process for siting. Although New
Mexico has preempted local governments, it has also needlessly
complicated the process by requiring separate applications for
need determinations, location approvals, and right-of-way
width determinations. 2 15 It is not clear that any interest is being served by such complexity. In Wyoming, there are separate
processes for siting depending on whether the applicant is a
utility or not.2 16 There is no apparent public purpose for that
distinction. 2 17 Several of the states require regulators to do
environmental analysis; 2 18 this is a perfectly reasonable requirement, as long as it is folded into a single decision-making
process, but to the extent it is a separate proceeding, it undermines coordination in the process.
All potential investors-whether utility or non-utilityshould be permitted to submit applications for approving the
siting of transmission. It appears that there are no absolute

214. See N.M STAT. § 62-9-3(I) (Supp. 2009).
215. See id. § 62-9-1 (requiring CPCN); § 62-9-3 (requiring location permit); §
62-9-3.2 (requiring right-of-way width determination when requested right-of-way
is more than 100 feet).
216. Compare WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-12-106 (2009) (applying to "person[s]"),
with id. § 37-2-205 (applying to utilities).
217. The only obvious reason for that distinction has to do with the utility's
possibility of including the proposed line in rate base. That issue has already
been explored above. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
218. See supra Part I.A.
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barriers to that possibility in three of the states, 2 19 but is not
clear that anyone other than utilities can apply in Colorado. 220
It is reasonable to establish such qualifications as financial
capabilities, and ability to comply with applicable environmental, safety, financial, and reliability standards, but limiting
eligibility to apply to utilities only unnecessarily limits access
to capital markets and reinforces the market power of incumbent utilities.
In all of the states eminent domain flows from status as a
public utility. 221 For the same reasons as enumerated above,
the powers of condemnation of property ought to flow out of the
siting process and not be bestowed on only one type of applicant. While there is no reason to limit the current eminent
domain powers vested in utilities, when it comes to transmission, there is no logic to providing eminent domain to one type
of actor who obtains siting approval and not to others. While
there ought to be criteria limiting how the powers of condemnation can be used (e.g., common carriage obligations or rightof-way maintenance), those conditions ought to be universally
applicable to all successful applicants. Interestingly, Wyoming
requires a utility to obtain a CPCN before exercising eminent
domain to build a transmission line; this goes only halfway to
recognizing eminent domain as an outcome of the siting
process, as it does not extend eminent domain to nonutilities.222 Eminent domain should be given for limited purposes and never to bestow undue advantage on any party or
class of parties. 223
Also, at least on a prospective basis, the costs of transmission should not be included in state retail rate base. For all of
the reasons enumerated above, it distorts the process of determining need. It also has the decided effect of affording utilities
the opportunity to socialize their transmission costs among native load customers, while other investors are putting their own

219. See supra Part I.B.
220. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-1-103 (2009).
221. See supra Part I.B.
222. See, e.g., WYo. STAT. ANN. § 37-2-205 (2009).
223. The advantages that accrue from being able to exercise eminent domain
powers are not limited to the actual exercise of them. In fact, it is often preferable
to not actually have to flex that muscle. That being said, the negotiating dynamics of acquiring property, and most likely the resulting price, can be heavily influenced by the fact that a seller is aware that the buyer possesses the power to condemn the seller's property in the absence of a mutually acceptable, consensual
agreement.
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capital at risk. It also forces regulators and siting officials to
look at applications with a localized bias, since all of the risks
of covering the lines are being imposed only on a subset of potential users of the line. Transmission costs ought to be borne
by all users by passing on the rates set by FERC. 2 24
Finally, geographic separation of states with similar concerns complicates the problem. 22 5 This complicates transmission planning by limiting the regions across which cost allocation can be agreed upon. While that does not per se affect
siting decisions, it does seem likely that it will limit the number of applications filed. Without greater coordination the net
effect over the long run is likely to be reduced market access for
those states seeking to export energy.

D. Interstate Governance Barriers
In addition to state-based legal barriers, there are broader
governance obstacles-at the levels of regional governance and
federalism-to the evolution of the public interest to accommodate new transmission siting issues. 22 6 A heightened role for
regional coordination seems inevitable, as the Waxman-Markey
bill envisions. However, the precise form of regional governance bodies and the role states will play in the regional
governance process seem quite uncertain. The uncertainty associated with governance decisions in planning and siting
transmission-for example, who, precisely, will make decisions?-alone may make it difficult for the extant legal regime
to attract the kind of capital necessary to sufficiently expand
the transmission grip to allow states to fully take advantage of
export and import opportunities.

224. There are a variety of other reasons for adopting such a policy, but they
are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Ross BALDICK ET AL., A
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON ALLOCATING THE COSTS OF NEW TRANSMISSION
INVESTMENT: PRACTICE AND PRINCIPLES (2007).

225. For example, despite being relative neighbors, and serving the same
Rocky Mountain market area, for purposes of allocating transmission costs Utah
and Wyoming are in one subregion (served by PacifiCorp, a multistate utility that
cuts across both states) and New Mexico and Colorado are in another.
226. Although a full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article, they are addressed here to highlight the alternative institutional setting to
defining the public interest in transmission line siting. At some level, states compete with FERC and regional entities for regulatory effectiveness, and in our view
for state regulation to remain relevant these institutional alternatives must be
taken into account and considered in determining the form and content of state
regulation.
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A purely state-led approach to coordination, such as the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative ("RGGI") in the eastern
U.S., may provide one approach to interstate governance.
However, this strategy may lack the certainty of a binding legal
regime and may be subject to the same kinds of legal challenges that have recently been mounted against the RGGI. 227
As an alternative, a top-down regional planning and siting
process, which is led by federal principles such as those endorsed in Waxman-Markey, 22 8 may produce a more uniform set
of principles to guide governance and overcome some of the obstacles of a purely state-led approach to regional coordination.
Even this, however, is not without its costs, as to truly be effective any regional body must engender a sufficient common purpose in cooperation among its stakeholders to overcome the
strong incentives an individual state may face in defecting to
the in-state benefits that have predominated in both conventional public utility paradigm as well as the modern approach
to siting in most states.
Associated with a move to interstate governance models
are even more complicated questions regarding cost sharing.
From a ratemaking perspective, the costs of transmission infrastructure are best spread among all of its beneficiaries,
whether they are located in or out of state. The conventional
public utility model poses a formidable barrier to such a costsharing principle. A recent report by the Center for American
Progress states the problem, which we highlight above, as
follows:
Under typical practices for financing electrical transmission
... the costs of projects are paid for principally by the ratepayers in the particular area where the project is built.
This policy creates a strong disincentive for utilities and
their state regulators to invest in transmission that will
have broader social benefits that extend beyond their jurisdictional boundaries. Thus, due to our system of cost recovery, as a nation we have underinvested in the backbone
227. The RGGI is an agreement between ten northeastern and mid-Atlantic
states to curb CO 2 emissions and coordinate activities toward that goal. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.orghome (last visited Feb. 12,
2010); see generally William Funk, Constitutional Implications of Regional C02
Cap-and-TradePrograms:The Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative as a
Case in Point, 27 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 353 (2009) (discussing legal challenges to the RGGI).
228. See American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §
151 (2009).
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electrical grid, relative to the benefits it could provide. Moving forward, the costs of future investments in the national
clean-energy smart grid will need to be shared differently,
reflecting the broadly dispersed environmental and economic benefits that these projects will generate for our
country.2 29
Because the primary beneficiaries are not located entirely in
the state in which many transmission facilities will be built,
the state ratemaking process alone will prove insufficient as a
mechanism for facilitating such cost sharing.
Cost-sharing principles may need to evolve in ways that
transcend individual state regulators, also presenting new
governance challenges. One solution may be to encourage cost
sharing as a voluntary governance principle between utilities
at the regional level. The Western Electricity Coordination
Council ("WECC"), formed in 2002, provides an opportunity for
such coordination. 2 30 Through standard tariffs terms, WECC
can provide a set of principles to assist state regulators in ensuring that cost-allocation principles are not overly parochial
and that there is not a significant mismatch between the benefits of new transmission and those who pay for it, whether they
are located in- or out-of-state. 23 1 Of course, a downside to such
a voluntary approach is that it is only as binding as the commitments of the individual utilities that comprise the interstate agreement.
Other solutions include more formalized arrangements or
an expansion of federal power. Although under current institutions such solutions may not be sufficient within the Western
Interconnection (the physical portion of the grid that comprises
states in the West), Independent Service Operators ("ISOs")
and RTOs hold some promise as a model for cost sharing in
other parts of the country. Even their cost-sharing mechanisms have proved problematic. According to the Center for
American Progress, "[elven in RTOs and ISOs with costallocation mechanisms and benefits analysis, cost-allocation
229. HENDRICKS, supra note 193, at 24.
230. Although WECC includes state regulators, it is primarily comprised of
public and private utilities that own transmission as well as consumers in western states. See Western Electricity Coordinating Council, http://www.wecc.biz/
About/Company/Pages/WECCMembers.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
231. For example, WECC has a variety of standards regarding reliability and
transmission planning. See Western Electricity Coordinating Council, Approved
http://www.wece.biz/Standards/Approved%20Standards/Forms/All
Standards,
Items.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
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decisions are often protracted and contentious." 232 An RTO or
ISO may be insufficient as a mechanism for cost sharing when
the benefits accrue beyond the RTO or ISO to a broader set of
beneficiaries. There is some reason to think that a regional
governance model for cost allocation alone would be insufficient
to sufficiently provide the incentives necessary to expand
transmission for renewable projects.
At a minimum, widely varying results can be expected
across regulatory proceedings in areas served by different ISOs
and RTOs. 233 For example, FERC approved the New York
ISO's process for regionally spreading the cost of new "economic" transmission projects. 234 In accepting the New York ISO's
emphasis on cost savings over other considerations, including
accessing "renewable generation," FERC rejected a challenge
by the New York Regional Interconnect ("NYRI")-a firm proposing to build a transmission line to carry 1,200 MW from
upstate New York to the New York City region. 235 FERC's approval endorsed a supermajority voting provision, which prohibited the regionalization of a transmission line's cost unless 80
percent of the New York ISO's transmission customers approve
the project. 236 Following FERC's approval of this arrangement,
NYRI withdrew its application to the New York Public Service
Commission, suggesting that the arrangement approved by
FERC allowed veto power by large transmission customers opposing the project. 237 By contrast, FERC accepted a proposal
by Southwest Power Pool, Inc. to regionalize the costs of
transmission for wind resources. 238 Southwest Power Pool's
standard rules would assign the cost of wind directly to specific
customers, rather than allocate them across the entire region.239 This proposal allocates a more limited range of cost to
232. HENDRICKS, supranote 193, at 22.
233. FERC has been criticized by a number of commentators for failing to develop governing policies or principles regarding allocating the costs for new
transmission. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring
the Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 483 (2005). As the two examples noted illustrate, rather than providing coherent guidance, FERC has
simply accepted agreements presented by various regions without any particular
regard to a consistent policy or principle.
234. New York Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 126 F.E.R.C. 1 61,320 at 13 (2009).
235. Id. at 6-7.
236. Id. at 11, 13.
237. Id. at 11.
238. NYRI made these same arguments for regionalization of transmission
costs before FERC, which rejected them. See id. at 13.
239. Sw. Power Pool, Inc. 127 F.E.R.C. T 61,283 (2009).
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new renewable wind projects, based on nameplate capacity rather than net dependable capacity (which, of course, is quite
significant for intermittent wind), and also assigns 67 percent
of the cost of upgrading transmission to serve wind to the entire Southwest Power Pool region. 240 In approving this project,
FERC found that the pool's "distinct treatment of these location-constrained resources is not unduly discriminatory" because renewable resource transmission expansion faces unique
challenges in comparison to the expansion of transmission for
more conventional sources of power generation. 24 1
In regard to closer coordination in the West, it is important to keep in mind that the ability to access markets by renewable energy is not merely a function of siting new turbines
and transmission lines. It also depends on dispatch protocols,
which are of particular concern to wind generators given their
intermittent nature. Most advocates for wind energy find that
RTOs offer the simplest environment for wind generators to
operate because of the way in which the markets function and
dispatch protocols operate. 2 42 Thus, despite their shortcomings
in some regards, RTOs offer real benefits. Less organized markets are more difficult terrain for renewable energy generators
to do business in. Similarly, planning and defining needs
across a broad geographic area will facilitate the siting process.
That also appears to occur more easily in an RTO than in the
absence of an RTO market, as experience in the West seems to
confirm. 24 3 At the same time, making an artificial distinction
in federal authority to preempt siting based on the existence of
an RTO that also lacks any preemptive effect over state parochialism risks hobbling the development of interstate markets
in renewable resources in the East. In the West, it may be
worthwhile for state regulators trying to promote the use of renewable resources to rethink the costs and benefits of forming
a region-wide RTO. 244
240. Id. at 6 T 24.
241. Id. at 8 T 29.
242. An RTO will provide a more predicable set of commitments, backed up
with the possibility of FERC enforcement.
243. Since the West lacks an RTO and has many isolated rural areas near natural resources that lack transmission infrastructure, renewables such as wind
have not flourished in the region as much as the natural availability of renewable
resources might support.
244. There have been a variety of reasons why RTO proposals for the West
(other than in California) have failed. Some of them related to cost/benefit concerns; fears that California would "suck in" lower cost energy from elsewhere,
thereby causing upward price pressure in other western states; and a desire not to
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Finally, as a last resort, to the extent states and regional
bodies cannot sufficiently address the issue on their own, cost
sharing will increasingly become an issue of federal regulation.
In part, FERC maintains that this is because it lacks sufficient
legal authority to do so, and it is lobbying Congress to expand
its power to more affirmatively build transmission costs into its
own price-setting authority. 2 4 5 According to FERC Chairman
Wellinghoff:
Under FPA Sections 205 and 206, the Commission ensures that public utilities' (investor-owned utilities) rates,
terms and conditions of transmission service in interstate
commerce are just, reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential. This responsibility includes allocating the costs of new transmission facilities built by public
utilities. At present, the Commission has greater ability to
assign such costs over broad geographic areas where there
is a regional transmission organization (RTO) or independent system operator (ISO).
If Congress determines that there are broad public interest benefits in developing the . . . transmission system

necessary to accommodate the Nation's renewable energy
potential, and therefore that the costs of transmission facilities needed to meet our renewable energy potential should
be fairly spread to a broad group of energy users (for example across a region or an entire interconnection), then Congress should consider giving the Commission clear authority
to allocate such transmission costs to all load-serving entities within an interconnection or part of an interconnection. 24 6
FERC has not adopted an effective set of costsharing/allocation principles for transmission, particularly
within the Western Interconnection (which lacks stronger regional approaches such as RTOs). However, such passivity on
the part of federal regulators is unlikely to continue in the con-

be an energy farm for California, which many states have, in the past, argued
should site its own plants in-state. As noted elsewhere in this Article, many of
these notions have changed as states seek to coordinate and build more transmission for the explicit purpose of exporting energy to such places as California.
Those objectives will invariably change the assumptions that drove the results in
previous cost/benefit studies. It would seem appropriate for state regulators to
revisit the issue of a region-wide RTO.
245. See Wellinghoff Senate Testimony, supra note 162, at 9.
246. Id.
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text of shifting political and economic currents that favor reducing barriers to expanding the grid. FERC's failure to adopt
a clear policy on the allocation of the costs of new transmission
may be due to the fact that it sees its current jurisdiction as limited. 247 At the same time, the beatings FERC took from some
powerful interest groups and their Congressional allies over
the effort to implement standard market design during Pat
Wood's tenure as Chair from 2001 to 2005 might suggest that
political constraints are more significant than any legal barriers the agency now faces. 24 8 Whether the FERC will remain
passive depends on whether, as seems quite possible, the
Commission reasserts its leadership and/or whether Congress
sees fit to enable, or perhaps even to mandate, a more assertive
regulatory posture on the federal level because the current approaches are insufficient. 24 9
The comprehensive Waxman-Markey climate bill adopted
by the House of Representatives in 2009 fails altogether to address the issue of allocating the costs of transmission
projects. 250 In contrast, the Bingaman bill pending in the
Senate provides FERC the jurisdiction to assign the costs of
new transmission projects. 2 5 1 At the same time, through the
Corker Amendment the Senate bill limits FERC's ability to
spread costs regionally to the extent "the costs are reasonably
proportionate to measurable economic and reliability
benefits." 25 2 Such a requirement to quantify benefits is likely
to lead to protracted litigation regarding FERC's authority to
regionally spread the costs associated with new renewable
projects, possibly undermining some of the principles FERC
has previously endorsed in approving transmission cost

247. See Pierce, supra note 233, at 484 (highlighting how states retain considerable jurisdiction over transmission under the Federal Power Act).
248. The 2001-2005 time period was a particularly tumultuous one in the politics of electricity. It coincided with the 2003 blackout in the Northeast as well as
the aftermath of the California power crisis. See generally Mary Anne Sullivan et
al., Standard Market Design: What Went Wrong? What Next?, ELECTRICITY J., July 2003, for more discussion of the controversies regarding FERC's effort to implement standard market design.
249. See generally Rossi, supra note 96, at 1044-48, for more discussion regarding the impact of impasses over cost allocation on building new transmission
lines.
250. See supra Part II.C (discussing Waxman-Markey).
251. See American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009, S. 1462, 111th Cong.
§ 121 (2009).
252. See id. (proposing amendment to section 216(i)(1)(B) of the Federal Power
Act, currently codified at 16 U.S.C § 824p (Supp. 2009)).
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allocation on a regional basis, such as in the Southwest Power
Pool. 2 53
While in principle the application of cost/benefit assessment is unassailable in this context, a recent Seventh Circuit
decision highlights how a judicially-imposed obligation to limit
benefits to narrow "reliability" factors-perhaps even more
than statutory limitation 254-could hobble the development of
new transmission lines for renewables by limiting the ability of
regional bodies to spread their costs. Following a model for
cost allocation that had been adopted among members of the
PJM Interconnection (an RTO comprised of utilities stretching
from mid-Atlantic states to midwestern states such as Illinois),
FERC approved the RTO's pro rata allocation of the costs
among members for new transmission of 500 kv and above. 25 5
Because the RTO's members span both concentrated (in its
western regions, including Chicago) and unconcentrated population areas, the direct benefit of transmission may vary across
distinct customer groups within the PJM Interconnection. 25 6
At the same time, there were recognized benefits of new 500 kv
transmission to network reliability for all PJM Interconnection
customers. 2 57 Consistent with its approach in other efforts to
regionalize the cost of transmission, FERC had not attempted
to quantify these benefits across all of PJM's members. 258
The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded FERC's approval of the PJM Interconnection cost-allocation formula for
new high-voltage transmission. 2 59 Writing for the panel, Judge
Richard Posner concluded that "FERC is not authorized to approve a pricing scheme that requires a group of utilities to pay
for facilities from which its members derive no benefits, or benefits that are trivial in relation to the costs sought to be shifted
to its members."2 60 Although Judge Posner was careful to suggest that there is no need to calculate benefits "to the last penny," he also highlighted that merely asserting "some benefit" is
insufficient. 2 61 An effort needs to be made to either quantify
such benefits or to conclude that the benefits are roughly
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 127 F.E.R.C. 1 61,283 (2009).
See Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476-77 (7th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 474.
Id. at 474-75.
Id. at 475.
Id.
Id. at 477-78.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 477.
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commensurate with a utility's share of sales in the entire PJM
region. 26 2
Judge Richard Cudahy issued a strong dissent to this part
of the panel's opinion, observing:
[I]t is not possible to realistically determine for each utility
and with reference to each major project the likelihood that
rate-simplification will reduce litigation, or to calculate the
precise value of not having to cover the costs of power failures and of not paying costs associated with congestion, and
all this over the next forty to fifty years. Concerns about the
real value to individual utilities of the stability and efficiency provided by improvements to the backbone grid are answered by their voluntary participation in the power pool and
its collaborative "RTEP" (or regional transmission expansion planning) process. Rate-making based on cost causation is assured by this process, since universal cost-sharing
is recommended only when developments are found to benefit the integrated system as a whole. 26 3
Judge Cudahy reasoned that imposing a precise quantification
of benefits, or even rough proportionality, is inconsistent with
past practice in regional grid pricing to address issues such as
cascading outages, and not required by any of FERC's rules or
precedents or the statutory language of the FPA.2 64
Whether imposed by courts or by Congress, a mandate to
precisely quantify the benefits to reliability of transmission
grid expansion upfront as a predicate to cost allocation can
pose a troubling regulatory requirement. Illinois Commerce
Commission v. FERC did not require absolute precision in allocating costs. 26 5 However, FERC's unwillingness to articulate
clear cost-allocation principles that can be applied consistently,
as illustrated by the disparate results in SPP and NYISO, as
well as the common historic practice of states simply putting
all transmission assets into retail rate base and the lack of any
coherent principles of policies governing cost allocation, may
have made judicial intervention of some sort almost inevitable.
While it is not yet clear what the full implications of the
Seventh Circuit decision or the Corker Amendment (if it ultimately becomes law) will be, FERC's deferring to regional
262. Id.
263. Id. at 479 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 480-81 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
265. See id. at 477 (stating that there is no requirement for agency to quantity
benefits "to the last penny").
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agreements, rather than articulating a coherent policy rationale for its cost allocation decisions, could well result in a
series of precedents that could effectively narrow the agency's
discretion to review transmission rates under the "just and
reasonable" principle. Even more limiting, it could enhance
opportunities for judicial second-guessing of agency judgments,
or Congressional intervention regarding the network benefits
of projects for reliability. Given the many challenges the
industry today faces, transmission policy and applicable costallocation principles should include such goals as energy security, promoting the diversification of power generation, and pollutant emission reductions in addition to economic objectives.
Such goals are best balanced by regulators and are highly difficult, if not impossible, to quantify with any meaningful precision over a forty- to fifty-year project life span.

CONCLUSION
As states assess the public interest against the backdrop of
changed conditions presented by wholesale competition and
heightened attention to climate change, regulators face the
challenge of evolving a new understanding of the public interest beyond its traditional meaning in state regulatory proceedings-especially if they are to succeed in harnessing new natural resources for energy production. Both legal and governance
barriers exist to the expansion of the transmission infrastructure that is necessary to harness these resources. States must
overcome these barriers if they are to retain their relevance as
regulatory authorities in the new environment. The legal and
political challenges are significant, but the opportunities to develop new opportunities for economic growth related to renewable power are even greater for natural resource-rich states.
Regulators will need to approach siting from a more general
regional perspective. Moreover, the issue of cost allocation
cannot be left to the traditional approach of state regulators,
and will need to be addressed in a manner that explicitly reflects the benefits to be derived from new transmission assets,
both user-specific and more general. Even if pending federal
proposals are adopted into law, state utility law will need to
evolve beyond its parochial traditions to a new understanding
of what the public interest in new transmission infrastructure
entails.
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